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In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho,1 the U.S.-based
online retail company filed a claim against a Korean2
national who registered and used the domain name
<amazoncar.com>. Internet users who resorted to this
domain name were directed to a website (with content in
Korean text) that offered to rent or lease Hyundai and Kia
automobiles.3 Amazon.com, whose own website offered
online sales of motor vehicles, in addition to books and other
merchandise, argued that users would mistakenly associate
the domain name with the U.S. company.4 The claim was
decided – not in a civil action in a court of law stateside,
Korea, or elsewhere, but instead – under the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP” or
“Policy”).5 Some background is in order.
In 1999, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numerals (ICANN) adopted the UDRP to provide for
an extrajudicial method of resolving disputes stemming
from the abusive registration and use of a domain name in

WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 20, 2001). Cho had also registered
<amazonecar.com>. Id.
2 All references to the country herein are to the Republic of Korea,
commonly known as South Korea.
3 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276.
4 Id.
5 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION
FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN) (1999),
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en
[hereinafter UDRP].
1
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violation
of
protected
trademark
rights,6
or
7
“cybersquatting.” The Policy is incorporated by reference
into every domain name registration agreement between an
ICANN-accredited registrar and a registrant, and “sets forth
the terms and conditions in connection with a dispute
between [the registrant] and any party . . . over the
registration and use of an Internet domain name registered
by [the registrant].”8 Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, a
registrant is “required to submit to a mandatory
administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a
‘complainant’) asserts . . . that
(i)   [the] domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has
rights; and
(ii)   [the registrant] ha[s] no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name;
and

See Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Oct. 25, 1999),
https://archive.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN, Second Staff Report]. ICANN adopted
the UDRP on the basis of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s
Final Report, The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual
Property Issues, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO)
(Apr. 30, 1999),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/reportfinal1.pdf [hereinafter WIPO, Final Report], and the recommendations of
others, ICANN, Second Staff Report, supra, ¶ 4.1.a.
7 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir.
2001) (citing S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999)).
8 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 1.
6
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(iii)  [the] domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.9
In order for the complainant (i.e., the party objecting to the
registration and use of the domain name) to prevail, it must
prove that all of the three elements are present,10 whereupon
an administrative panel of one or three members may order
that the domain name be transferred to the complainant or
cancelled.11 Of the UDRP proceedings that result in a panel
decision, a significant majority (over 80%) are rendered in
favor of the complainant.12
ICANN does not itself administer the proceedings,
nor does it decide any case.13 Instead, ICANN assigns the
case management to approved dispute resolution service

Id. ¶ 4(a).
Id.
11 These are the only remedies permitted under the Policy. Id. ¶ 4(i).
12 As of May 2004, the most recent statistics provided by ICANN, in the
decisions that resulted in a panel decision: nearly 81% of the subject
domain names were transferred to the complainant (80.5%) or cancelled
at the request of the complainant (0.4%); and 14.2% of the domain names
stayed with the respondent. The remaining decisions were categorized
under “Split decision.” Archived Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (May 10, 2004),
https://archive.icann.org/en/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm. The statistics
are similar for WIPO-administered UDRP cases as of June 30, 2015: 87.5%
in favor of the complainant (85.88% transferred; 1.64% cancelled); and
12.48% in favor of the respondent. Case Outcome (Consolidated): All Years,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/decision_rate.jsp?ye
ar= [hereinafter WIPO Case Outcomes].
9

10

13

UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(h); see id. ¶ 6.
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providers.14 Each provider maintains a list of panelists from
which it appoints panelists to decide cases on the merits.15
Panel decisions are not necessarily binding, and do not have
the force of a judicial ruling. That is, the UDRP does “not
prevent either [the respondent] or the complainant from
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction
for independent resolution before such mandatory
administrative proceeding is commenced or after such
proceeding is concluded.”16 Thus, even if the panel decides
in favor of the complainant and orders cancellation or
transfer of the domain name, ICANN will not implement the
panel’s decision if the registrant commences a timely court
action against the complainant.17 In practice, however, most
registrants against whom a UDRP claim is brought do not
participate in the proceeding,18 and do not resort to the

The list of currently approved providers includes the Asian Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Centre, the National Arbitration Forum,
WIPO, the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet
Disputes, and the Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute Resolution.
List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, ICANN,
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en.
15 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN ¶ 6(a),
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en
[hereinafter UDRP Rules].
14

16

UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(k).

Id.
Professor Sorkin reported in 2001, “Default proceedings are
commonplace; domain name registrants do not even file a response in
one third to one half of all UDRP cases . . . .” David E. Sorkin, Judicial
Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 42 (2001). The default rate in WIPO17
18
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courts to challenge the panel’s decision.19 As a result,
ICANN’s implementation of the panel’s decision is the final
action in the large majority of UDRP proceedings.
Ultimately, the Policy provides for a streamlined, efficient,
and inexpensive method of resolving disputes.20

administered proceedings involving Korean parties is over 70%. Ilhyung
Lee, The Korea Database: WIPO-Administered UDRP Decisions, the First
Fifteen Years (2000-2014), 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 261, 309-10 (2015).
19 For a list of court actions related to UDRP proceedings, see Selection of
UDRP-related Court Cases, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/challenged/.
20 The rules provide that the panel must forward its decision to the
provider within fourteen days after the panel appointment, except in
“exceptional circumstances.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 15(b). As
WIPO notes:
The main advantage of the UDRP Administrative
Procedure is that it typically provides a faster and
cheaper way to resolve a dispute regarding the
registration and use of an Internet domain name than
going to court. In addition, the procedures are
considerably more informal than litigation and the
decision-makers are experts in such areas as
international trademark law, domain name issues,
electronic commerce, the Internet and dispute
resolution. It is also international in scope: it provides a
single mechanism for resolving a domain name dispute
regardless of where the registrar or the domain name
holder or the complainant are located.
WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO
(“A. Scope of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
What Are the Advantages of the UDRP Administrative Procedure?”),
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/ [hereinafter WIPO
Guide].
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The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), based in Geneva, Switzerland, was the provider
and case administrator in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho.21
The Policy provisions governed. Regarding procedural rules,
ICANN’s Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“UDRP Rules”)22 and the WIPO
Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“WIPO Supplemental Rules”)23 were in
effect. WIPO appointed three panelists to decide the merits
of the case: one each from the United States, Korea, and New
Zealand. The panel issued a divided decision. The majority
concluded that Amazon.com proved the three elements
under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, and ordered the transfer
of the domain names to the complainant.24 The Korean
panelist dissented, stating that Amazon.com failed to satisfy
the bad faith element.25

WIPO was the first dispute resolution service provider accredited by
ICANN and the first to receive cases under the UDRP. WIPO Guide,
supra note 20 (“C. Preparing and Filing a Complaint, To Which Dispute
Resolution Service Provider Do I Submit My Complaint?”). The
complainant chooses the provider that will administer the proceeding by
submitting the complaint to that provider. UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(d).
22 ICANN originally approved the rules on October 24, 1999, and later
approved amendments, on October 30, 2009, and September 28, 2013. See
UDRP Rules, supra note 15.
23 World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/rules/supplemental/
[hereinafter WIPO Supp. Rules].
24 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec.
20, 2001).
25 Id. (Hwang, Pan., dissenting). The majority’s decision and the separate
dissenting opinion are discussed infra text accompanying notes 382-91.
21
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The decision is an introductory example of an
extrajudicial resolution of a domain name dispute in the
international setting, and is similar in some respects to an
international arbitration matter. The parties are from
different countries and are involved in a dispute relating to
an economic interest; legal standards and principles apply in
the resolution of the claim. Rather than resorting to the
courts (in the country of either party or another country),
they seek a decision made by a private, neutral tribunal. The
administering organization appoints three panelists to
decide the case. In such cases, decisions are mostly
unanimous, but there are occasional dissents.
The Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho decision is one
of fifty-eight WIPO-administered26 UDRP proceedings

Currently, the domain names <amazoncar.com> and <amazonecar.com>
both resolve to a link within Amazon.com’s main website at
<amazon.com>, featuring “Automobile Parts and Accessories.”
According to information available on <whois.com>, the current
registrant of the domain names is listed as “Hostmaster, Amazon Legal
Dept.” Whois amazoncar.com, WHOIS,
http://www.whois.com/whois/amazoncar.com; Whois amazonecar.com,
WHOIS, http://www.whois.com/whois/amazonecar.com.
26 All WIPO-administered UDRP decisions are publicly available on its
Internet site. Search WIPO Cases and WIPO Panel Decisions, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/; Index of WIPO UDRP
Panel Decisions, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/legalindex.jsp. In
addition, WIPO provides a summary of panel decisions on key
procedural and substantive issues that commonly arise. WIPO Overview
of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview2.0/
[hereinafter WIPO Overview 2.0]. The consensus or clear majority views
on some issues are indicated, as well as other questions that have
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involving Korean parties27 decided by a three-member
panel, from the beginning of the implementation of the
UDRP in 1999 to the end of 2014 (“58 decisions”). This article
provides a summary of the 58 decisions and offers analysis
of selected cases. This study is an extension of a separate
work that surveys all 818 WIPO-administered UDRP
proceedings28 that include a party connected to Korea – “one
of the world’s most-wired countries.”29 The decisions of the
three-member panels herein reflect the collective
deliberations of the (often international) panelists, which
decisions elaborate on specific provisions of the Policy and
the UDRP Rules, and also occasionally include separate
opinions and disagreement within the tribunal. Because any
discussion of the UDRP proceeding will remind of the
arbitration method as alluded to above, the discussion
begins in Part I with a clarification and elaboration: a UDRP
matter is not one of arbitration, although there are

attracted “a diversity of views.” Id. WIPO notes that although neither
WIPO Overview 2.0 nor prior panel decisions are binding on the panels,
“predictability remains a key element of dispute resolution systems.” Id.
27 For purposes of this study, the nationality of each party is taken from
its address as indicated in the text of the decision. There is one caveat.
The address of the respondent party is often based on unverified
information provided by the registrant at the time of the domain name
registration.
28 Lee, supra note 18.
29 Sang-Hun Choe, South Koreans Connect Through Search Engine, N.Y.
TIMES (July 5, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/05/technology/05online.html?_r=0
&pagewanted=print (describing Korea as “one of the world’s mostwired countries”).

2016

THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS

439

similarities between the two, and indeed, the basics of an
international arbitration are reflected in a UDRP proceeding.
Part II elaborates on the interpretation and application of
various provisions of the Policy that govern the resolution of
a UDRP dispute, as indicated by the three-member panels
from the 58 proceedings. This part includes a separate
discussion devoted to the minority of decisions where the
panel denied the complaint, thus allowing the respondent to
retain the domain name. Finally, with the characteristics of
international commercial arbitration practice in mind, Part
III highlights ten of the 58 decisions that yielded separate
views by individual panelists. These ten decisions bring to
light disagreement among the panelists. A critique is also
offered for some separate opinions. An appendix of all 58
decisions completes the article.
I.  UDRP AND ARBITRATION
The UDRP drafters considered arbitration as the
method to resolve domain name disputes, but decided
against it.30 As explained herein, a proceeding under the
UDRP is not arbitration; the commentary has affirmed this
point.31 Moreover, U.S. courts have ruled that for purposes

WIPO, Final Report, supra note 6, ¶ 234.
E.g., Ljiljana Biukovic, International Commercial Arbitration in Cyberspace:
Recent Developments, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 319, 337 (2002); A. Michael
Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy” – Causes and
(Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 687 (2002); Sorkin, supra, note 18, at
41-42; Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration
Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 171-72 (2002).
30
31
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of the Federal Arbitration Act,32 a UDRP decision does not
qualify as an arbitration award.33 Yet some commentators,34
courts,35 and UDRP panelists36 have imprecisely referred to

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2016).
E.g., Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003); Parisi v.
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 745-46 (E.D. Va. 2001). See Storey
v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C, 347 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Unlike
traditional binding arbitration proceedings, UDRP proceedings are
structured specially to permit the domain-name registrant two bites at
the apple.”).
34 E.g., Jordan A. Arnot, Navigating Cybersquatting Enforcement in the
Expanding Internet, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 329, 330
(2014) (“UDRP is an international arbitration process established by
ICANN”; “UDRP arbitration proceeding”); Stephen McJohn, Top Tens of
2013: Patent, Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secret Cases, 12 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 177, 197 (2014) (“arbitration under the UDRP”); Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 225 (“arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy”); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste:
Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 355
(“4,000 arbitrations under the UDRP”); Allan R. Stein, Parochialism and
Pluralism in Cyberspace Regulation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2012 (2005)
(“international arbitration . . . pursuant to the resolution dispute policy
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers”); Jason
Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used To Address
Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 507 (2013) (“(UDRP), which
governs domain name arbitrations in the current gTLD domain
system”); Recent Cases, Cyberlaw – Trademark Law – WIPO Arbitrators
Uphold Conjunctive View of Bad Faith Under the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2130, 2130, 2133 (2014)
(“(UDRP), a system of international arbitration”; “arbitrations under the
UDRP”)).
35 E.g., ISystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., No. 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672,
at *3 n.11 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (per curiam) (“arbitration pursuant to
the UDRP”; “UDRP arbitrations”); Calista Enters. Ltd. v. Tenza Trading

32
33
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the UDRP process as “arbitration.”37 More precisely, the
UDRP provides for an administrative proceeding, in contrast to
arbitration.38

Ltd., No. 3:13–cv–01045–SI, 2014 WL 3670856, at *1 (D. Or. July 23, 2014)
(“UDRP arbitration panel”); Parker Waichman Alonso LLP v. Orlando
Firm, P.C., No. 09 Civ. 7401(CM), 2010 WL 1956871 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May
14, 2010) (“Arbitration decisions governed by the UDRP”); Olympic
Sports Data Servs., Ltd. v. Maselli, Misc. Action No. 07-117, 2010 WL
310772, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2010) (“arbitration under the UDRP”);
Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“This
arbitration procedure mandated by the accreditation agreement is the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure (hereinafter ‘UDRP’).”).
36 E.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Li XiaoLi, WIPO Case No. D20121401 (Sept. 5, 2012) (referring to “[m]any UDR arbitration panelists”);
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. #1 Viagra Propecia Xenical & More Online
Pharm., WIPO Case No. D2003-0793 (Nov. 30, 2003) (“the majority of
UDRP arbitration decisions”). See Baltimore Museum of Art, Inc. v. Mo
Domains, WIPO Case No. D2005-0720 (Sept. 1, 2005) (“adverse ICANN
UDRP arbitrations”); Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault v. Mr. Minwoo
Park, WIPO Case No. D2003-0989 (Feb. 12, 2004) (“the arbitration
proceeding will be unduly delayed”); Cognigen Networks, Inc. v.
Pharm. Outcomes Research, WIPO Case No. D2001-1094 (Dec. 18, 2001)
(“the Complainant’s pursuit of this UDRP arbitration”).
37 Perhaps there is understandable reason for the confusion. All publicly
available UDRP decisions administered by WIPO have at the top of the
first page the caption, WIPO “Arbitration and Mediation Center.” In
addition to UDRP proceedings, WIPO provides administration services
for arbitration and mediation. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/background.html.
Another ICANN-approved dispute resolution service provider is the
National Arbitration Forum (NAF). NAF’s Internet site includes a
searchable database for its UDRP decisions under various fields,
including “Arbitrator.” Domain Name Dispute Proceedings and Decisions,
NAF, http://www.adrforum.com/SearchDecisions.
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Black’s Law Dictionary reports that “arbitration” in
English was first used in the fifteenth century.39 Over time,
there have been many meanings. For purposes of discussion
herein, this article adopts a definition contained in a
previous edition of Black’s: “The reference of a dispute to an
impartial (third) person chosen by the parties to the dispute
who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator’s award
issued after a hearing at which both parties have an
opportunity to be heard.”40 The elements of the basic

Froomkin, supra note 31, at 687. Then Circuit Judge Sotomayor
emphasized the “administrative proceeding” phrasing, and used it
throughout her opinion in Storey, 347 F.3d at 376. The Policy specifies
that a proceeding brought under it is a “mandatory administrative
proceeding” or “administrative proceeding.” UDRP, supra note 5, ¶¶
3(c), 4, 4(a), 4(h), 4(k), 5, 8(a), 8(b). The panel that decides the dispute is
the “Panel” or “Administrative Panel.” Id. ¶¶ 3(c), 4(b), 4(c), & (e)-(k).
The UDRP Rules further define: “Panel means an administrative panel
appointed by a Provider to decide a complaint concerning a domainname registration”; and “Panelist means an individual appointed by a
Provider to be a member of a Panel.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 1.
There are four references to “arbitration” and one to “arbitrator” in the
text of the Policy, all directed to a proceeding separate from the UDRP
proceeding. UDRP, supra note 5, ¶¶ 5, 8(a), 8(b).
39 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY xxxi & 125 (10th ed. 2014).
40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). These elements are present
in provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2016).
Section 2 of the Act provides that an arbitration agreement is
enforceable; section 4 gives the district court the authority to compel
arbitration; section 9 allows the court to issue an order confirming the
award; section 10 provides the limited grounds on which a court may
vacate the award and which grounds the Supreme Court has ruled are
exclusive. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
Section 10 also refers to a “hearing.” 9 U.S.C. § 10. Black’s tenth edition
38
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definition most relevant here are: (i) the agreement by the
parties to resort to the extrajudicial procedure and (ii) the
binding nature of the impartial panel’s award. These
essential aspects of arbitration are not present in the UDRP
process.
Foremost, “[a]rbitration can only take place if both
parties have agreed to it.”41 In a UDRP proceeding, there is
no agreement at all between the two parties – the respondent
(the registrant of a disputed domain name) and the
complainant (who alleges that the registrant’s registration of
the domain name violates the complainant’s trademark
rights).42 The only operative agreement is between the
registrant and the registrar, in which the registrant agrees,
inter alia, to submit a dispute to an administrative
proceeding brought by a complainant that is not known at
the time of the agreement. The complainant is not a party to
the agreement. Some commentators suggest that the UDRP
process triggers a form of “third party beneficiary”
arbitration.43 But again, this approach departs from the basic

defines arbitration as follows: “A dispute-resolution process in which the
disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to make a final
and binding decision resolving the dispute. . . . The parties to the dispute
may choose a third party directly by mutual agreement, or indirectly,
such as by agreeing to have an arbitration organization select the third
party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 125.
41 What Is Arbitration?, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-arb.html.
42 See Speidel, supra note 31, at 172-73.
43 A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 135 (2000) (referring
to “UDRP-like mandatory third-party beneficiary clauses that created
arbitration rights for any aggrieved trademark holder”). See Benjamin G.
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definition of arbitration, which requires an agreement
between the principals. Moreover, by agreeing to the
arbitration method, the parties waive their right of access to
the courts for the resolution of their dispute on the merits,44
and in the U.S., the right to a jury trial.45 Once the parties
agree to resort to arbitration and the arbitration panel issues
an award, a court may refuse to recognize the award46 or

Davis, Une Magouille Planetaire: The UDRP Is an International Scam, 72
MISS. L.J. 815, 862 n.74 (2002) (referring to “the contours of the third
party beneficiary relationship for the registry/registrar with the parties
to the dispute once a complaint is filed”); Froomkin, supra note 31, at 612
(referring to ICANNN “requir[ing] registries (and also registrars) to
promise to subject all registrants to a mandatory third-party beneficiary
clause in which every registrant agrees to submit to ICANN’s UDRP
upon the request of aggrieved third parties who believe they have a
superior claim to the registrant’s domain name).
44 Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The
right to an Article III forum is not absolute and may be waived. Where
an individual consents to arbitration, he waives the right to an impartial
and independent adjudication.”) (citing Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986); Marsh v. First USA Bank,
N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“[A] valid arbitration
provision . . . waives the right to resolve a dispute through litigation in a
judicial forum . . . .”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:
Arbitration, Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants As a Hybrid From of
Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2006) (“Mandatory
arbitration agreements . . . waive the right to litigate future legal claims
in a judicial forum in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
45 E.g., Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 921; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004).
46 In the international setting, the New York Convention provides for the
seven grounds on which courts of a contracting party may refuse
recognition of an arbitration award. Convention on the Recognition and
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may vacate the award47 only on very limited grounds.
Perhaps the consequences of the arbitration method explain
the requirement that the effecting arbitration agreement
between the parties be in writing.48
To emphasize, a UDRP panel’s decision on the merits
is not binding,49 or more technically, there is no agreement
between the parties that the decision will be binding. As

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
47 For the limited grounds for vacating an award in the U.S., see Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2016). See UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, G.A. Res. 40/72, art. 34(2), U.N.
Doc. A/40/17/Annex I & A/61/17/Annex I (June 21, 1985) (model
arbitration law’s grounds).
48 New York Convention, supra note 46, art. II(1) (“Each Contracting State
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake
to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.”) (emphasis added); Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2016) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”) (emphasis
added). The reason for imposing the writing requirement in arbitration
agreements “is self-evident. A valid agreement to arbitrate excludes the
jurisdiction of the courts and makes arbitration an exclusive method for
dispute resolution.” Nilanjana Chatterjee, Arbitration Proceedings under
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy - Myth or Reality,
10 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 67, 84-85 (2006).
49 See Sorkin, supra note 18, at 42; Speidel, supra note 31, at 174-75.
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indicated earlier, even if the panel decides in favor of the
complainant and orders a transfer or cancellation of the
domain name, the respondent may avoid ICANN’s
implementation of the panel decision by bringing an action
in court.50 Indeed, either party may ignore the UDRP
proceeding altogether and seek resolution in the courts
before, during, or after the proceeding.51
Even though the UDRP procedure does not fit within
the traditional definition of arbitration, there are important
similarities between a UDRP proceeding and arbitration.52
Foremost and fundamentally, both offer an extrajudicial
method to resolve a dispute over a commercial interest as an
alternative to adjudication in the courts. There is also often
an international component in many UDRP and arbitration
proceedings, when the parties are of different nationalities,
cultures, and languages. The UDRP proceeding (and some

UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(k).
The current edition of Black’s has an entry for “nonbinding
arbitration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 126. The phrase
has been used to describe a UDRP proceeding, e.g., Bord v. Banco de
Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002); Sherry, supra note 34, at
354; Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law
Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 129, 149 (2002). The term is a “misnomer . . . because arbitration is usu.
intended to result in a final, binding award.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 39, at 126. In my view, except for the rare situation where the
parties agree to disregard the arbitration award and instead agree on a
settlement (with party autonomy reigning supreme), an arbitration by
definition cannot be nonbinding.
52 See Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under
National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 44 (2002); Julia Hörnle, The
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure: Is Too Much of a Good
Thing a Bad Thing?, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 254 (2008).
50
51
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arbitration matters) involves an institutional case manager53
who oversees the conduct of the proceeding, under specified
rules and guidelines. In addition, several features of the
UDRP procedure appear to be borrowed from the
international arbitration model, especially relating to the
panels (and individual panelists) that decide the dispute.
Specifically, these features address (1) the panelists’
qualifications; (2) the panelists’ required disclosures before
and after appointment; (3) the number of panelists
comprising the panel; (4) party involvement in the selection
of panelists; (5) the role of the presiding panelist (or chair);
(6) the nationality of the panelists; and (7) the powers and
authority of the panels during the proceeding. These
characteristics are addressed in order.
(1) Regarding the qualifications of tribunal members,
the major international arbitral organizations impose a basic
requirement that every arbitrator be “impartial and
independent.”54 The UDRP Rules repeat this very phrasing

In arbitration, the parties may agree to craft the procedures of the
arbitration themselves (ad hoc arbitration), or to abide by the rules and
practices of an administering organization (institutional arbitration). See
generally Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 2 ICC
ICARB. BULL. 8 (1991).
54 Am. Arbitration Assoc., International Arbitration Rules, art. 13(1)
(2014) [hereinafter AAA Rules]; Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration
Rules, art. 11(1) (2012) [hereinafter ICC Rules]; London Court of Int’l
Arbitration, Arbitration Rules, art. 5.3 (2014) [hereinafter LCIA Rules].
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, the leading rules for ad hoc arbitrations,
provide, “The appointing authority shall have regard to such
considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent
and impartial arbitrator . . . .” G.A. Res. 68/109, art. 6(7), U.N. GAOR,
53
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for the administrative panel.55 WIPO offers that its panelists
are “well-reputed for their impartiality, sound judgement
and experience as decision-makers, as well as their
substantive experience in the areas of intellectual property
law, electronic commerce and the Internet.”56 (2) A
prospective arbitrator must disclose any circumstances that
might give rise to “justifiable doubts” as to her impartiality
or independence.57 Some organizations add that such doubt
or question should be considered in “the eyes”58 or “the
mind”59 of the parties. A UDRP panelist is likewise under a
duty to disclose “any circumstances giving rise to justifiable

68th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules].
55 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 7.
56 WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel.html. See also WIPO
Guide, supra note 20 (“E. Who Are the Panelists”) (“The persons
appearing on the WIPO Center’s list of Domain Name Panelists have
been selected on the basis of their well-established reputation for their
impartiality, sound judgment and experience as decision-makers, as well
as their substantive experience in the areas of international trademark
law, electronic commerce and Internet-related issues.”).
57 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 13(2); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.4;
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 11. See ICC Rules, supra note 54, art.
11(2) (requiring disclosure of “any facts or circumstances which might be
of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in
the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could give rise
to reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality”).
58 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 11(2).
59 LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.4.
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doubt as to the Panelist’s impartiality or independence,”60 to
which WIPO practice adds that the question of
independence be considered “in the eyes of one or both of
the parties.”61
(3) With respect to the number of arbitrators, the rules
of most administering organizations provide that a single
arbitrator will preside over the arbitration, unless the parties
agree on a different number, or the organization in its
discretion determines that a three-member tribunal is
necessary.62 In a UDRP proceeding, a sole panelist decides
the case,63 unless either the complainant or the respondent
elects to have the dispute decided by a panel with three
members.64 (4) In an arbitration, if a single arbitrator is to
decide the dispute, the administering organization appoints
the arbitrator, unless the parties agree on a different
procedure.65 In a UDRP proceeding, the provider appoints a

UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 7. The duty to disclose is a continuing
one. Id.
61 Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence,
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statement/panel.html.
62 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 11; ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(2);
LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.8. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54,
art. 7.
63 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(b).
64 Id. ¶ 6(c). If the complainant elects to have a three-member panel, the
complainant must pay the applicable fees. If the complainant elects a
single panelist and the respondent elects to have three panelists, the
parties must share the fees of a three-member panel. Id.
65 AAA Rules, supra note 54, arts. 12(1) & (6); ICC Rules, supra note 54,
art. 12(3); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 8(1). The LCIA takes a
different approach: “No party or third person may appoint any
arbitrator under the Arbitration Agreement: the LCIA Court alone is
empowered to appoint arbitrators (albeit taking into account any written
60
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single panelist from its list of approved panelists.66 Where an
arbitration agreement provides for three arbitrators, some
arbitral organizations allow each party to nominate one of
the arbitrators.67 In a UDRP proceeding with a three-member
panel, there is also party involvement in the selection of the
panelists – each party is to provide a list of three candidates,
“drawn from any ICANN-approved Provider’s list of
panelists,” to serve as one of the panelists.68 The rules also
state that the provider “shall endeavor” to appoint one
panelist from the list of candidates provided by each of the
parties.69

agreement or joint nomination by the parties).” LCIA Rules, supra note
54, art. 5.7.
66 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(b).
67 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(4); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.8;
see UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 9(1) (“If three arbitrators are to
be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.”).
68 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3(b)(iv), 5(b)(v), 6(d). The WIPO
Supplemental Rules add that the party must indicate its order of
preference. WIPO Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(a).
69 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). The WIPO Supplemental Rules state
that in appointing a panelist in this situation, WIPO “shall, subject to
availability, respect the order of preference indicated by a Party.” WIPO
Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(a). In the event that a provider is unable
to confirm timely the appointment of a panelist from either party’s list of
candidates, “the Provider shall make that appointment from its list of
panelists.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). Also, if the complainant
elects to have a three-member panel and the respondent defaults, WIPO
“shall, subject to availability, appoint one Panelist from the names
submitted by the Complainant and shall appoint the second Panelist and
the Presiding Panelist from its published list.” WIPO Supp. Rules, supra
note 23, ¶ 7(c)(ii).
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(5) In an arbitration with three arbitrators, one of the
arbitrators serves as the chair or presiding arbitrator of the
tribunal. This is of practical significance in that she, as first
among equals, serves a leading role in the conduct of the
arbitration, may vote to break ties when the partynominated arbitrators disagree,70 and takes on the principal
responsibility of drafting the resulting award. The rules of
one administering organization provide that it will select the
president of the arbitral tribunal unless the parties have
agreed on another procedure.71 Another method seen in
practice is for the two party-appointed arbitrators to select
the presiding arbitrator.72 For proceedings under the UDRP,
“The third Panelist shall be appointed by the Provider from
a list of five candidates submitted by the Provider to the
Parties, the Provider’s selection from among the five being
made in a manner that reasonably balances the preferences
of both Parties, as they may specify to the Provider . . . .”73
ICANN’s UDRP documents do not specify the role or the
title of the third panelist, but the WIPO Supplemental Rules
provide that the third panelist “shall be the Presiding
Panelist.”74

See ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art.
26.5; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 33(2).
71 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(5).
72 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 9(1).
73 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). From the list of candidates for the
presiding panelist, each party may indicate its order of preference. WIPO
Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(b)(ii). The WIPO Supplemental Rules
provide that “[n]otwithstanding the procedure provided for in
Paragraph 6(e) of the [UDRP Rules], the Parties may jointly agree on the
identity of the Presiding Panelist.” Id. ¶ 7(b)(iii).
74 WIPO Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(b)(i).
70
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(6) Where an arbitration involves opposing parties
from different countries, the nationality of the arbitrator
deciding the case is of some moment.75 Most arbitral rules
address the nationality of the parties or arbitrators
explicitly.76 Some provide that where the parties are of
different nationalities, the sole panelist or the chair must be
of a nationality other than those of the parties, unless the
parties agree otherwise.77 Given that many disputes under
the UDRP involve parties from different countries, perhaps
it is surprising that the Policy, the UDRP Rules, and the
WIPO Supplemental Rules do not specifically mention the
nationality of the parties or panelists. WIPO does note that
its list of panelists “is international, consisting of some 400
Panelists from over 50 countries, many of whom are multilingual.”78 Especially because some proceedings involve

For a discussion of the nationality of the arbitrator in international
commercial arbitration, see Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The
Nationality of the International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603 (2008).
76 E.g., AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(4) (“At the request of any party
or on its own initiative, the Administrator may appoint nationals of a
country other than that of any of the parties.”); ICC Rules, supra note 54,
art. 13(1) (“In confirming or appointing arbitrators, the [ICC] shall
consider the prospective arbitrator’s nationality, residence and other
relationships with the countries of which the parties or the other
arbitrators are nationals. . . .”) (emphasis added); see UNCITRAL Rules,
supra note 54, art. 6.7 (“The appointing authority . . . shall take into
account the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other
than the nationalities of the parties.”) (emphasis added).
77 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 13(5); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 6.1.
78 WIPO Guide, supra note 20 (“E. Who Are the Panelists”). See WIPO
Domain Name Panelists, supra note 56 (“WIPO panelists come from
different regions of the world . . . .”).
75
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more than one language,79 it is likely that the nationality of
the parties and prospective panelists is taken into account
when providers appoint individual panelists. In a UDRP
proceeding where the complainant and respondent are from
different countries, a three-member panel whose
composition includes both nationalities will contribute to
party confidence in the system.80
(7) Once appointed, the arbitrator has wide discretion
in conducting the arbitration.81 In contrast to the arbitrator,
the tasks of the UDRP panelist are more circumscribed,
especially given that generally the proceeding does not
allow for discovery (of the type seen in U.S. civil actions) or
in-person hearings.82 Yet the UDRP panel has similar
discretion and authority to “conduct the administrative

The UDRP Rules address the matter of the language of the proceeding.
UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 11. For a decision discussing the rule, see
infra text accompanying notes 265-71.
80 A discussion of the composition of the panels in the 58 decisions
herein, by nationality of the panelists, appears infra text accompanying
notes 376-77.
81 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 20(1) (“Subject to these Rules, the
arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it
considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality
and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair
opportunity to present its case.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 14.5
(“The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the widest discretion to discharge
these general duties, subject to such mandatory law(s) or rules of law as
the Arbitral Tribunal may decide to be applicable . . . .”).
82 Paragraph 13 of the UDRP Rules states: “There shall be no in-person
hearings (including hearings by teleconference, videoconference, and
web conference), unless the Panel determines, in its sole discretion and
as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for deciding
the complaint.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 13.
79
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proceeding in such manner as it considers appropriate in
accordance with the Policy and these Rules”83 and
“determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and
weight of the evidence.”84 Toward a decision, the panel may
consider, in addition to the party submissions and the UDRP
documents, “any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”85
With this background in hand, we turn to the
decisions of the UDRP panels in the 58 proceedings
involving Korean parties.
II.  

THE COMPLAINANT’S CASE AND THE RESPONDENT’S
DEFENSE, BY THE 58 DECISIONS

A.   THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS
As one panel stated, “The overriding objective of the
Policy is to prevent abusive domain name registration and
use for the benefit of legitimate trademark owners . . . .”86 To
reiterate, under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, in order for the
complainant to obtain transfer or cancellation of the
disputed domain name, it must show that: the domain name
“is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service
mark in which the complainant has rights”; the respondent
has “no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain

Id. ¶ 10(a).
Id. ¶ 10(d).
85 Id. ¶ 15(a).
86 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citing Telstra Corp. v.
Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (Feb. 18, 2000)).
83
84
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name”; and the domain name “has been registered and is
being used in bad faith.”87 WIPO-administered decisions
typically include the panel’s disposition of each of the three
elements of paragraph 4(a).88 This Part highlights and
elaborates on the requisite elements, as interpreted and
applied by the panels in the 58 decisions.
1.   DOMAIN NAME IS “IDENTICAL OR CONFUSINGLY
SIMILAR TO A TRADEMARK OR SERVICE MARK IN
WHICH THE COMPLAINANT HAS RIGHTS”

The complainant having rights in a trademark or
service mark is a prerequisite to the question of whether the
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that
mark.89 In the large majority of UDRP decisions, the
complainant demonstrates such rights by registration and
use. In most cases, registration is presumptive evidence of
valid rights.90 In those instances where the complainant did

UDRP, supra note 15, ¶ 4(a).
In one of the 58 decisions, the panel’s discussion of paragraph 4(a) is
limited to the bad faith element in 4(a)(iii), and does not address directly
the other two elements. JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais
Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20,
2013).
89 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008).
90 In one decision, the respondent invited the panel to disregard the
registration of a mark (“JET TOURS”), urging that it was descriptive or
generic. Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250
(May 26, 2006). The panel declined, stating, “[I]t is only in very limited
circumstances that a Panel may examine the circumstances of a
trademark registration to determine whether the registration satisfies the
requirements of the Policy (e.g. in cases where the trademark registration
87
88
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not register the mark, it may nevertheless demonstrate
common law rights91 through use. For example, in
Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc.,92 although
“shoulderdoc.co.uk” was not a registered mark, the panel
determined that the complainant’s use of the term on its
website and in its brochure satisfied the preliminary
requirement of rights in a mark. Noting that the
complainant’s use would allow the public to see the mark as
indicating the origin of services, the panel found that “the
Complainant is likely to have generated sufficient reputation
and goodwill in the name <shoulderdoc.co.uk> . . . to have
acquired common law rights in a shoulderdoc.co.uk mark in
England and Wales.”93 Evidence of trademark rights in any
country is sufficient for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the
Policy.94 Indeed, the complainant need not necessarily show
rights in the country of the respondent or the registrar.95

is automatic or unexamined, as occurs with the United States state
registrations).” Id.
91 Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (May
20, 2009).
92 WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 (Sept. 8, 2006).
93 Id. The source-indicating function is indeed the “hallmark of a
trademark,” Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods.,
134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1998), and a definitional component, Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition for “Trademark”
includes use “to indicate the source of the goods”).
94 Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239; IPGM Inst. Mixte de
Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D20071513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citation omitted).
95 But trademark rights in other countries, and the extent to which the
mark is known worldwide, may be relevant to the question of whether
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In two of the 58 decisions, the panel held that the
complainant failed to show that it had rights in a mark. In
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Unitedeurope Consulting,96 the
complainant had registrations for various marks beginning
with the “T-” prefix, including “T-BIZ”, “T-BOX”, “T-CITY”,
“T-HOME”, “T-JOBS”, “T-NETWORK”, “T-HEALTH”, “TPORTAL”, and “T-SALES”, which corresponded to nine of
the eleven disputed domain names. The complainant argued
that it also had trademark rights relating to <tbroadcast.com> and <t-show.com>, relying on its European
Community registrations for “T” and non-registered marks
rights to “T-[descriptive term].” The panel disagreed, stating
that “[s]uch a finding with regard to trademark rights would
be overly broad.”97
In the proceeding involving the domain name
<gopets.net>, the panel determined that there was no
evidence to support registered trademark rights or
“common law (i.e.[,] unregistered) trademark rights.”98
There, the complainant sought to obtain rights based on the
registration and use of its own domain name <gopets.com>
(which was not the subject of the proceeding). The

the respondent was aware of the complainant’s mark and was acting in
bad faith under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.
96 WIPO Case No. D2006-0930 (Dec. 27, 2006).
97 The panel reasoned that “such an issue is one that is more proper for
the relevant trademark offices and courts of law – not these
administrative proceedings.” Id.
98 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008). The two parties in the proceeding were also
involved in an action in the U.S. district court, brought by the
respondent. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27 & note 230.
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complainant had registered the domain name nine years
before its commencement of the UDRP proceeding, and had
developed a marketing plan and referred to “development
tasks” concerning the intended website. The panel ruled that
these were insufficient to show trademark rights: “The
Complainant’s preparatory plans and research do not show
that it has used a mark ‘in trade’. It merely indicates an
intention to do so. But such an intention does not show that
it has actually been done . . . .”99
Once rights in a mark are established, the panel’s
discussion turns to the question of whether the domain
name is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s
mark. This entails an objective test, a comparison between
the complainant’s mark and the domain name at issue.100 For
purposes of this comparison under paragraph 4(a)(i), the
presence of the generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) (e.g., “.com” or “-.net”), a technical requirement in every domain
name, is generally disregarded.101 Thus, panels have

Id.
IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citing Magnum Piering, Inc.
v. Mudjackers & Garwood S. Wilson, Sr., WIPO Case No. D2000-1525
(Jan. 29, 2001)); Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007). One panel added that this comparison is
“independent of the use factors usually considered in a traditional
trademark infringement action.” IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du
Groupe Mornay, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513.
101 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089
(Apr. 23, 2014); Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO
Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v.
Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407
(Oct. 17, 2011); Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No.
99

100
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determined that the first element of paragraph 4(a) was
satisfied in decisions involving the following domain names:
<carfax.net>;102 <chivas.net>;103 <ifil.com>;104 <itau.com>;105
<maxell.net>;106 <sony.net>;107 and <samsung.com.ve>.108
These domain names were challenged by the respective
complainant whose mark appeared in full in the domain
name, followed by the gTLD. Panels have also found
confusing similarity where the domain name incorporates
the complainant’s mark, with the only difference being the
alteration of a letter (<herts.com>109); the deletion of a letter

D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009); IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe
Mornay, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513; STX LLC v. Yu nae ho, WIPO Case
No. D2006-0567 (Aug. 14, 2006); Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006); Carfax, Inc. v. COMn.COM, WIPO
Case No. D2002-0513 (Sept. 18, 2002). See WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note
26, ¶ 1.2 (“The applicable top-level suffix in the domain name . . . would
usually be disregarded under the confusing similarity test . . . .”).
102 Carfax, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0513.
103 Chivas Bros. Ltd. v. Anyweb Co., WIPO Case No. D2006-1446 (Feb. 2,
2007).
104 IFIL S.p.A v. Han Jin Go, WIPO Case No. D2007-0535 (Aug. 15, 2007).
105 Banco Itau S.A. v. Webmedia, WIPO Case No. D2008-0531 (July 18,
2008).
106 Hitachi Maxell Kabushiki Kaisha v. Gyuhwa Chung, WIPO Case No.
D2003-0079 (May 1, 2003) [in Korean].
107 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. sony.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-1074 (Nov.
28, 2000).
108 Samsung Networks Co. v. SuperVirtualOffice Corp., WIPO Case No.
DVE2010-0001 (May 10, 2010).
109 Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Jeff Park, WIPO Case No. D2007-1120 (Nov. 9,
2007).
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(<nursefinder.com>110);
the
deletion
of
a
space
111
(<nbcuniversal.com> ); the deletion of a space and a letter
(<unitedairline.com>112); the deletion of an apostrophe, a
letter, and a space (<samclub.com>113); and the addition of a
generic word or a geographic name inserted before or after
the
mark
(<mysony.com>,114
<amazon119.com>,115
<amazoncar.com>,116<amazonpic.com>,117
<amazonfire.com>,118<casioshop.net>,119
<minkagroup.com>,120<weddingritz.com>,121
<samsungturkey.com>,122 <playboysportsbooks.com>123).

Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417
(July 5, 2007).
111 NBC Universal, Inc. v. Junak Kwon, WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec.
23, 2004).
112 United Airlines, Inc. v. United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO Case No.
D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002).
113 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2006-0226 (June
20, 2006).
114 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Sin, Eonmok, WIPO Case No. D2000-1007
(Nov. 16, 2000).
115 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D2001-1275
(Dec. 20, 2001). “119” is the Korean equivalent of “911” stateside, for
emergency services.
116 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec.
20, 2001).
117 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330 (July 22,
2002).
118 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar.
2, 2004).
119 Casio Keisanki Kabushiki Kaisha v. Jongchan Kim, WIPO Case No.
D2003-0400 (July 15, 2003).
120 Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Lee Wongi, WIPO Case No. D2004-0984 (Feb.
22, 2005).
110
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i.   RESPONDENT HAS “NO RIGHTS OR LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS IN RESPECT OF THE DOMAIN NAME”
Procedurally, the complainant has the ultimate
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, each
of the elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.124 But the
requisite element relating to the respondent’s rights or
legitimate interests in the domain name calls on matters that
are “peculiarly within the knowledge of the Respondent”
and imposes on the complainant “the [often] impossible task
of proving the negative.”125 Thus, for purposes of paragraph
4(a)(ii), panels have decided that the complainant satisfies its
initial burden by making a prima facie case that the
respondent lacks a right or interest in the domain name,
upon which the burden shifts to the respondent to show that
it has such a right or interest.126 One panel advised that a

Hotel Ritz, Ltd. v. Kim Min-Kouk, WIPO Case No. D2004-0154 (June
23, 2004).
122 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630
(Feb. 16, 2010).
123 Playboy Enters. Int’l, Inc. v. Sookwan Park, WIPO Case No. D20010778 (Oct. 1, 2001).
124 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013).
125 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (quoting Belupo d.d. v.
WACHEM d.o.o., WIPO Case No. D2004-0110 (Apr. 14, 2004)).
126 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089
(Apr. 23, 2014); Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading
Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011) (citing
Clerical Medical Inv. Grp. Ltd v. Clericalmedical.com, WIPO Case No.
121
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prima facie case is made if the complainant shows that “it
has not granted any rights to the Respondent, that the
Respondent has no links with the Complainant and that the
disputed domain name is not the name of the
Respondent.”127
In practice, in a significant number of UDRP
proceedings, the complainant makes a prima facie case in its
complaint, and the respondent defaults.128 In these
circumstances,129 the panel must independently determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the
respondent’s right or legitimate interest. Paragraph 4(c)
provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the
respondent may demonstrate “rights or legitimate interests
to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i)   before any notice to you of the dispute,
your use of, or demonstrable preparations
to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in
connection with a bona fide offering of
goods or services; or

D2000-1228 (Nov. 28, 2000)); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Hackers Language
Inst./David Cho, Ph.D., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089 (Nov. 27, 2006).
127 Educ. Testing Serv., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089. See Jet Marques v.
Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006) (quoting
Cassava Enters. Ltd. v. Victor Chandler Int’l Ltd., WIPO Case No. D20040753 (Nov. 11, 2004)).
128 See supra note 18.
129 In the event of a default, the rules allow the panel to decide the
dispute based on the complaint, “[i]n the absence of exceptional
circumstances.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 5(e). The panel may “draw
such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.” Id. ¶ 14(b).
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(ii)   you (as an individual, business, or other
organization) have been commonly known
by the domain name, even if you have
acquired no trademark or service mark
rights; or
(iii)  you
are
making
a
legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain
name, without intent for commercial gain
to misleadingly divert consumers or to
tarnish the trademark or service mark at
issue.130
As discussed herein, where the respondent was successful in
demonstrating a right or legitimate interest in the domain
name, it has most frequently been under paragraph 4(c)(i).
Most of the decisions that contain significant
discussion of the respondent’s right or interest appear to fall
in one of two categories. In the first, there is a prior
relationship between the complainant and respondent before
the dispute emerges. The second includes decisions that
involve a domain name (identical or similar to the
complainant’s mark) that the respondent contends is a
generic or descriptive term to which it has a right to use on
the Internet. These decisions are addressed in turn.
In Topfield Co. v. Jai Kemp & Digital Products Group Pty
131
Ltd., the Korean complainant had registrations worldwide
(including Australia) for the “TOPFIELD” mark, used for
television set-top boxes and personal video recorders. The

130
131

UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(c).
WIPO Case No. DAU2008-0002 (Apr. 21, 2008).
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complainant challenged the Australian respondent’s
registration and use of the domain names <itopfield.com.au> and <topfield-australia.com.au>, which the
respondent was using for its operations as a local distributor
of the complainant. The parties disputed whether there was
a termination of the distribution agreement. The panel
proceeded on the basis that the distributorship was not
terminated. It determined that the active websites for which
the domain names were used “were consistent with the
legitimate operations of a distributor of the Complainant’s
products,” and thus, there was a bona fide offering of
services under paragraph 4(c)(i).132
There was also a relationship of sorts between the
parties in Educational Testing Service v. Hackers Language
Institute/David Cho, Ph.D.133 There, the complainant
developed the Test of English for International
Communication (TOEIC) and Test of English for Foreign
Languages (TOEFL), well-known standardized tests for
assessing English language proficiency, and especially
familiar to students in Korea who desire to study in the
United States. The complainant challenged the respondent’s
registration of the domain names <hackerstoefl.com> and
<hackstoeic.com>. The respondent claimed trademark rights
of its own, from its registration in Korea of “HACKER’S”,
used for studying methods for the TOEFL and TOEIC tests –

Regarding the question of whether use by an authorized dealer or
reseller is a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of
paragraph 4(c)(i), the panel referred to the requirements offered in Oki
Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0903 (Nov. 6,
2001).
133 WIPO Case No. D2006-1089 (Nov. 27, 2006).
132
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the “Hacker’s Program for the TOEFL Test” and the
“Hacker’s Program for the TOEIC Test.”134
The panel found that the respondent demonstrated a
right or interest in the domain name under paragraph 4(c)(i),
stating, “The Respondent has been operating the websites
under the disputed domain names for a bona fide offering of
goods and services before receiving notification regarding
the dispute.”135 The panel also commented on the ongoing
co-existence between the two parties, noting: “use of these
domain names has apparently been tolerated by the
Complainant”; and “the Complainant apparently still

Id. The respondent’s argument that it could not offer preparation
materials for the TOEFL or TOEIC test “without naming the
Complainant’s marks,” id., reminds of the “nominative fair use” defense
seen in U.S. trademark law. As Judge Kozinski explained,
[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the
plaintiff’s product, rather than its own, we hold that a
commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense
provided he meets the following three requirements: First, the
product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product or service;[] and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992) (footnote and citation omitted).
135 Educ. Testing Serv., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089. Without referring to
paragraph 4(c)(ii), the panel also noted, “The Respondent is commonly
known by the disputed domain names, as evidenced by the number of
visitors to its websites and the amount of queries for ‘hackers toeic’ and
‘hackers toefl’ in a well-known search engine in the Republic of Korea.
Around 64 % of all TOEFL applicants in the Republic of Korea have
utilized the ‘Hackers TOEFL’-program.” Id.
134
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tolerates the use of its trademarks in combination with the
Respondent’s trademark as part of the title of the books and
programs which the Respondent has published.”136
There is also a group of decisions in which the panel
elaborated on the respondent’s right or interest in the
domain name, where the respondent contended that the
domain name was a generic or descriptive term. These
decisions pit the holder of the following marks versus the
party that registered the corresponding domain names:
“NEWS REPUBLIC” v. <newsrepublic.com>;137 “JET
TOURS”
v.
<jettour.com>;138
“MORNAY”
v.
139
<mornay.com>;
“NURSEFINDERS”
v.
<nursefinder.com>;140 and “SHOULDERDOC.CO.UK” v.
<shoulderdoc.co.uk>.141
In
the
dispute
over
the
domain
name
<newsrepublic.com>, the panel declared that the
complainant failed to make even a prima facie case showing
that the respondent lacked a right or legitimate interest.142
But even if the panel were to accept that the complainant
established a prima facie case, the panel continued, the

Id.
Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089
(Apr. 23, 2014).
138 Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May
26, 2006).
139 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008).
140 Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417
(July 5, 2007).
141 Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625
(Sept. 8, 2006).
142 Mobile’s Republic, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089.
136
137
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respondent had submitted sufficient evidence to rebut it.
The panel explained that “a respondent may have a right to
register and use a domain name to attract Internet traffic
based on the appeal of a commonly used descriptive term,
even when the domain name is confusingly similar or
identical to a complainant’s registered mark,” so long as that
domain name is registered “because of its attraction as a
dictionary word or combination of descriptive terms, and
not because of any value corresponding to a trademark; the
use of the domain name must also be consistent with its
attraction as dictionary words or descriptive terms.”143 Here,
the panel noted that there was a descriptive nature to the
domain name, which incorporates “news” and “republic”
(the latter term meaning, when used with another word, “a
body of persons freely engaged in a specified activity”).144
The panel found that the complainant’s use of the website
“to gather in one place links to news sites is consistent with
the ordinary meanings of the terms combined to form the
disputed domain name.”145 Thus, the use of the domain
name was a bona fide offering of goods or services under
paragraph 4(c)(i) and confirmed the respondent’s right or
interest in the domain name.146
In
the
decisions
involving
<jettour.com>,
<mornay.com>,
<nursefinder.com>,
and

Id.
Id. & n.3 (citing Merriam-Webster online dictionary).
145 Id.
146 Id. The panel also noted that the respondent had purchased the
disputed domain name from a party that had previously used it for
several years for “a website displaying news articles and links to other
news services.” Id.
143
144
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<shoulderdoc.co.uk>, the panel in each case, after discussing
at length the question of whether the respondent had a right
or interest in the domain name, declined to reach a finding
on the matter, in light of the panel’s instructive
determination regarding the bad faith element under
paragraph 4(a)(iii).147 The panel in most of these decisions
noted a connection between the second and third elements,
specifically, that the question of whether the respondent had
a right or interest depends on whether the respondent was
aware of the complainant and its mark, which relates to

Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May
26, 2006) (stating, “There are significant gaps in the evidence provided
on this issue by both parties, and the Panel believes that it has
insufficient information to make any reliable finding on it. . . . In the end,
the Panel is clear in its view that the Complainant has failed to discharge
its burden of proving bad faith under Paragraph 4(a)(iii), and it is
therefore not necessary to reach a conclusion under Paragraph 4(a)(ii).
Accordingly, we make no finding under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy,
and the Complaint falls to be decided under paragraph 4(a)(iii).”); IPGM
Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO
Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (stating, “The Panel finds that
whether the second element of the Policy has been met is a fairly close
question. . . . [T]he Panel has concluded that the third element of the
Policy has not been met. Therefore, the Panel finds that it is not
necessary to decide whether the second element has been met.”);
Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (July
5, 2007) (stating, “Because [the question of the respondent’s right or
interest] goes to the heart of the Complainant’s bad-faith argument, it is
addressed below in connection with the third UDRP element.”);
Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625
(Sept. 8, 2006) (stating that “it is not necessary in the particular
circumstances of this case to make a finding under paragraph 4(a)(ii).”).
147
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whether it was acting in good faith (or bad faith).148 Or as the
panel in the <nursefinder.com> decision wrote,
[T]he Respondent’s use of the Domain Name
would not be deemed to be in connection with
a bona fide commercial offering if the evidence
indicated that the Respondent selected generic
words that were identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark of which the Respondent
was or should have been aware, with the likely
effect of misleading Internet users as to the
source of the website associated with the
Domain Name. . . . Because that question goes
to the heart of the Complainant’s bad-faith
argument, it is addressed below in connection
with the third UDRP element.149
ii.   DOMAIN NAME “HAS BEEN REGISTERED AND IS BEING
USED IN BAD FAITH”
Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy requires evidence that
the domain name “has been registered and is being used in
bad faith.”150 Paragraph 4(b) provides,
For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii),
the following circumstances, in particular but
without limitation, if found by the Panel to be

Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417; Shoulderdoc Ltd., WIPO
Case No. D2006-0625; Jet Marques, WIPO Case No. D2006-0250.
149 Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
150 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(a)(iii).
148
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present, shall be evidence of the registration
and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i)   circumstances indicating that you have
registered or you have acquired the
domain name primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring
the domain name registration to the
complainant who is the owner of the
trademark or service mark or to a
competitor of that complainant, for
valuable consideration in excess of your
documented out-of-pocket costs directly
related to the domain name; or
(ii)   you have registered the domain name in
order to prevent the owner of the
trademark or service mark from reflecting
the mark in a corresponding domain
name, provided that you have engaged in
a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii)  you have registered the domain name
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the
business of a competitor; or
(iv)  by using the domain name, you have
intentionally attempted to attract, for
commercial gain, Internet users to your
web site or other on-line location, by
creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of

V. 23
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your web site or location or of a product or
service on your web site or location.151
An aside here. Precisely what is required to satisfy the
bad faith element under paragraph 4 of the Policy has been a
subject of much discussion by UDRP panels. Some panelists,
emphasizing the “conjunctive” phrasing of paragraph
4(a)(iii) (“registered and is being used”), have declared that
the provision requires both bad faith registration and bad
faith use.152 Therefore, under this approach, if either bad
faith registration or bad faith use is absent, then this
requisite element is not met, and the complaint must be
denied.153 But other panelists emphasize the prefatory
language of paragraph 4(b) (“For the purposes of Paragraph
4(a)(iii), the following circumstances . . . shall be evidence of
the registration and use . . . in bad faith”) to conclude that
evidence demonstrating the presence of any of the four non-

Id. ¶ 4(b).
E.g., Strongarm Designs, Inc. v. Arisu Tech, WIPO Case No. D20010776 (Sept. 17, 2001). See Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung
Trading Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17,
2011) (stating that “the Complainant must prove that both registration
and use of the disputed domain name are in bad faith”); VoiceStream
Wireless Corp. v. Hanjin Ko, WIPO Case No. D2001-1411 (Mar. 25, 2002)
(referring to “twin requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy”).
153 E.g., Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239
(May 20, 2009). Or put another way, if either bad faith registration or bad
faith use is absent, then it is dispositive, and it is not necessary for the
panel to address the other. IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe
Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008)
(noting absence of bad faith registration, which was dispositive);
Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905
(Oct. 10, 2006) (same).
151
152
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exhaustive examples (incidentally, three of which refer to
registration and one to use) is sufficient to satisfy the
requisite element in paragraph 4(a)(iii).154 Some panelists
ultimately place themselves in the latter camp, when they

Panelist Sally M. Abel addressed this point in a decision outside of the
58 decisions herein, in which she stated:
The Policy speaks for itself. While Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of
the Policy requires that the Complainant prove that the
‘domain name has been registered and is being used in
bad faith,’ that requirement is further illuminated by the
language of Paragraph 4(b) addressing ‘Evidence of
Registration and Use in Bad Faith’. Paragraph 4(b)
expressly delineates four, each free-standing, examples
of what a panel may find to be ‘evidence of the
registration and use of a domain name in bad faith’ but
first underscores that these examples are not the
exclusive basis for finding registration and use in bad
faith . . . . Thus the Policy contemplates that the
circumstances of bad faith registration and use
presented in particular cases will not necessarily fall
neatly into one or more of the four examples contained
in the Policy, but are helpful guideposts for panels
considering unique sets of facts as to the type of
behavior the Policy is intended to address.
Dean Hill Sys. Ltd. v. Gregory Santana, WIPO Case No. D2002-0404
(Sept. 20, 2002) (citing American Mensa, Ltd. v. Millennium Energy
Niche Studies Associative, WIPO Case No. D2000-1030 (Jan. 26, 2001))
(Abel, Pan., concurring).
Within the 58 decisions, some panels have found bad faith
registration and use under paragraph 4(a)(iii) based on one example
provided in paragraph 4(b). E.g., Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. []
Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Minka
Lighting, Inc. v. Lee Wongi, WIPO Case No. D2004-0984 (Feb. 22, 2005)
(finding bad faith in paragraph 4(b)(iv)); NHN Corp. v. NHN Corp.,
WIPO Case No. D2003-0939 (Feb. 27, 2004) (paragraph 4(b)(i)).

154
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begin with the statement that paragraph 4(a)(iii)’s
“requirement is conjunctive, and therefore the Complainant
must establish both bad faith registration and bad faith use,”
but then add, “For purposes of the Policy, a finding of any of
the circumstances listed in Paragraph 4(b) will be sufficient
to establish registration and use in bad faith.”155 The debate
over the interpretation of paragraph 4(a)(iii) continues for
UDRP panelists, and has seen lively and innovative
arguments.156 The split is not addressed directly in WIPO’s

Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar.
2, 2004) (citations omitted). See Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. [] Vertical
Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007).
156 Panelist Tony Willoughby offered a comprehensive discussion of the
matter in Camon S.p.A. v. Intelli-Pet, LLC, WIPO Case No. D2009-1716
(Mar. 12, 2010). There, he discussed, among much more, the significance
in the phrasing of the prefatory language in paragraph 4(b) (“the
following circumstances . . . shall be evidence of the registration and use of
a domain name in bad faith”) (emphasis added) in contrast to that of
paragraph 4(c) (“the following circumstances . . . shall demonstrate your
rights or legitimate interests to the domain name”) (emphasis added).
Another decision of interest is Guru Denim Inc. v. Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim AbuHarb, WIPO Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27, 2013), where the majority of
the panel, in denying the complaint due to the absence of bad faith
registration, began the discussion regarding the bad faith element:
There are broadly two views of the interpretation of the
requirements for bad faith under the third element of the
Policy, namely the “unitary” and the “conjunctive”
views. . . . Suffice it to say here that the majority
subscribes to the “conjunctive” view or in other words
that the plain literal meaning of the third element of the
Policy is that both registration and use in bad faith must
be found individually before the requirements of that
element are fulfilled.
155
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overview of panel decisions on common issues, and no
consensus view is identified.157 In all events, the 58 decisions
herein include examples of both approaches to the
application and interpretation of paragraph 4(a)(iii) (and
4(b)).158

Id. The dissenting panelist disagreed that “the plain literal meaning of
the third element” required a finding of both registration and use in bad
faith individually, and also urged,
The majority sets up a dispute that does not exist
between the majority and minority view. The minority
view has never contended that one need only prove bad
faith registration or bad faith use. That would be a
conflict between a conjunctive and disjunctive view, a
view which the minority has never held. Rather the
dispute is that the majority treats bad faith registration
and use as a binary concept. One must separately prove
bad faith registration, th[e]n separately prove bad faith
use. Under the majority view one must prove one plus
one. The minority view treats bad faith registration and
use as a unitary concept. One is required to prove that
under all the facts and circumstances that the
respondent is acting in bad faith by intending to profit
from the good will developed in the complainant’s
trademark. There is no arithmetical calculation required.
Id. (Donahey, Pan., dissenting). The decision has received attention in
recent cases. Cyberlaw, supra note 34, at 2130 (noting, “it is important to
supplement the majority opinion with a robust policy defense”).
157 See WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26.
158 Compare Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co,
Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011) (requiring
proof of “both registration and use of the disputed domain name are in
bad faith”) with Esquire Innovations, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856
(stating “any one” of four circumstances in Paragraph 4(b) of Policy
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There is universal agreement that bad faith on the
part of the respondent for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii)
presumes that the respondent was aware of the complainant,
the owner of a protected mark.159 The examples provided in
paragraph 4(b) support this point. The respondent is
presumed to have knowledge of the owner of the mark (i) to
whom it intends to sell the domain name, (ii) to prevent the
owner from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain
name, (iii) to disrupt the business of the owner, a competitor,
or (iv) to attract Internet users by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the owner’s mark.
One question that arises in this context is whether the
doctrine of constructive notice seen in U.S. trademark law is
adopted in UDRP proceedings. The Lanham Act provides:
“Registration of a mark on the principal register . . . shall be
constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership
thereof.”160 But UDRP panels “have generally declined to
adopt the United States doctrine of constructive notice to the
bad faith requirement.”161 Thus, there must be evidence that
the “domain name registrant was actually aware of the
complainant and its mark and selected the domain name to
take some advantage of the mark and any good will attached

“shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad
faith”).
159 HSM Argentina S.A. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017
(May 1, 2007); Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2006-0625 (Sept. 8, 2006); Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case
No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006).
160 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2016).
161 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013).
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to it,”162 or “facts that might support an inference of
knowledge.”163
Turning to the decisions where the panel found the
bad faith element to be satisfied,164 the most common basis is
the respondent’s attempt to attract Internet users to its
website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s mark, under paragraph 4(b)(iv).165 This is
frequently seen in cases where the disputed domain name
resolves to a website whose content includes text or links
relating to the complainant’s services or products,166 its

Id.
Id. As another observed, “Rarely, if ever, will there be direct proof that
a respondent was fully aware of a complainant’s trademark rights and
intentionally registered a disputed domain name in bad faith. And so it
is not surprising that a respondent may assert ignorance of a
complainant’s trademark rights. Accordingly, a panel must always look
to the circumstantial evidence in making this determination.” Deutsche
Telekom AG v. Unitedeurope Consulting, WIPO Case No. D2006-0930
(Dec. 27, 2006).
164 Panels often identify which of the four examples in paragraph 4(b) are
present. In some decisions, a finding of bad faith is based on multiple
examples provided in paragraph 4(b). Esquire Innovations, Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2007-0856 (finding bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(i), (ii), &
(iv)); Chivas Bros. Ltd. v. Anyweb Co., WIPO Case No. D2006-1446 (Feb.
2, 2007) (same); Groupe Canal+ Co. v. Jinsoo Yoon, WIPO Case No.
D2006-1240 (Dec. 26, 2006) (same); Carfax, Inc. v. COMn.COM, WIPO
Case No. D2002-0513 (Sept. 18, 2002) (same).
165 E.g., Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No.
D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Jeff Park, WIPO Case No.
D2007-1120 (Nov. 9, 2007); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case
No. D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002) (2-1 decision).
166 E.g., Knowland Grp. v. Trademark Mgmts., WIPO Case No. D20111005 (Aug. 26, 2011) (noting respondent’s “website . . . contained a
number of links to goods and services related to the software and
162
163
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competitors, or sometimes more brazenly, the complainant
directly.167 Illustrative is Tokyu Corp. v. Jeongyong Cho, where
the complainant, Tokyu Group, “one of the leading
enterprise groups in Japan,” operated “a wide variety of
hotel businesses, and [was] expanding in the various forms
of hotels, as symbolized by the opening of new ‘The Capitol
Hotel Tokyu.’”168 The respondent registered the domain
name <capitoltokyu.com>, which resolved to a website that
featured hotels in Japan.169 The panel concluded that the
respondent intended to cause confusion with respect to the
source of the products or services in the website, “as well as
the sponsorship and capital or business tie-up with the
Complainant and the Tokyu Group, leading customers to
believe that the Respondent is affiliated with the
Complain[an]t, and gaining commercial profits by using the
Domain Name.”170

business solution, in connection with which the Complainant has
consistently used the KNOWLAND Mark since 2004.”); Casio Keisanki
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Jongchan Kim, WIPO Case No. D2003-0400 (July 15,
2003) (stating, “Respondent, by using the disputed domain name to lead
to a website promoting, for commercial gain, goods identical with the
designated goods of the Complainant’s trademark, has intentionally
sought to confuse internet users as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation
or endorsement of his website.”).
167 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar.
2, 2004) (stating, “Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the
<amazonfire.com> domain name can be inferred from Respondent’s
inclusion of the entire AMAZON.COM trademark in the
<amazonfire.com> Domain Name . . . .”).
168 WIPO Case No. D2008-1407 (Dec. 28, 2008).
169 Id.
170 Id.
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Bad faith is also frequently found when the
respondent attempts to sell the domain name to the
complainant or the complainant’s competitor at a high(er)
price, under paragraph 4(b)(i)), an example of classic
cybersquatting. For example, in Playboy Enterprises
International, Inc. v. Sookwan Park,171 the Korean respondent
registered the domain name <playboysportsbooks.com>
days after the complainant announced its intention to
operate
an
online
sports
wagering
site
at
<playboysportsbook.com>. According to the complainant,
the respondent then contacted the complainant and
requested a payment of $1,000 for the transfer of the domain
name. The panel found that this was an offer to sell the
domain name for an amount in excess of out-of-pocket
expenses, under paragraph 4(b)(i).172
A finding of bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(ii),
wherein the respondent is found to have engaged in a
pattern of registering domain names in order to prevent the
owner of the mark “from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name,” is less frequent in the UDRP
resolutions. Among the 58 decisions herein, the only
decision in which this element was the sole basis for a
finding of bad faith is Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Sin, Eonmok,
which involved the domain name <mysony.com>.173 The
panel found that in addition to this domain name, the
respondent had previously registered numerous other
domain names that incorporated the complainant’s “SONY”

WIPO Case No. D2001-0778 (Oct. 1, 2001).
Id.
173 WIPO Case No. D2000-1007 (Nov. 16, 2000).
171
172
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mark, all without the complainant’s authorization.174 Bad
faith may also be found under paragraph 4(b)(iii), where the
respondent registered the domain name “primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.”175 There
is no decision from the 58 decisions in which bad faith was
found under this provision alone.176
As noted above, the list of circumstances indicating
bad faith in paragraph 4(b) is not exhaustive. Panels have
relied on other factors to satisfy the bad faith element. For
example, in a decision involving the disputed domain name
<sony.net>,177 the panel initially concluded that there was no
evidence to support any of the criteria set out in paragraph
4(b). Emphasizing that the provision’s list is non-exhaustive,
the panel stated,
The Domain Name can only sensibly refer to
the Complainant, there is no obvious possible
justification for the Respondent’s selection of

These domain names included: <calsony.com>; <hotsony.com>;
<mildsony.com>; <onytour.com>; <sonycall.com>; <sonyfashion.com>;
<sonyfund.com>; <sonym.com>; <sonymild.com>; <sonymotors.com>;
<sonyms.com>; <sonyn.com>; <sonypresents.com>; <sonyshow.com>;
<sonystock.com>; <sonystocks.com>; <sony7.com>; <sony77.com>;
<sony777.com>; <sunsony.com>. The panel also noted that the
respondent registered over other 2,000 domain names, incorporating
well-known trademarks such as “HYUNDAI”, “LPGA”, “NASDAQ”,
“NFL”, and “SAMSUNG”. Id.
175 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(b)(iii).
176 But examples involving non-Korean parties are available. E.g.,
Diebold, Inc. v. Paul Terwilliger, WIPO Case No. D2003-0416 (July 15,
2003); Carpetright PLC v. Carpets Direct, WIPO Case No. D2001-0287
(Apr. 26, 2001).
177 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. sony.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-1074 (Nov.
28, 2000).
174
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the Domain Name, the Respondent has not
sought to put before the Panel any justification
for its selection of the Domain Name and it is
difficult to conceive of any use of the Domain
Name, which will not be likely to cause
confusion of some kind. In the Panel’s view the
threat that such use may be made of the
Domain Name constitutes use in bad faith.178

Id. The decisions also include discussion of other circumstances that
may constitute bad faith for purposes of paragraph 4 of the Policy, and
the views therein indicate the range of discretion that a panel may
exercise in its findings. One panel declared that the respondent’s use of a
privacy service to shield its identity was not “evidence in itself of bad
faith.” Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007). But another stated that the
respondent’s “attempts to conceal its true identity are further evidence of
its bad faith.” United Airlines, Inc. v. United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO
Case No. D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002).The panel in Bright Horizons Family
Solutions Inc. denied the complaint; in United Airlines, Inc., the panel
ordered the transfer of the domain name.
The respondent’s failure to reply to the complainant’s cease and
desist letter “may in some circumstances be relevant to” registration and
use in bad faith. Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2007-0795. “For example, it could undermine the credibility of an
explanation proffered at a later stage which one might have expected to
have been given earlier, if true.” Id. Ultimately, the panel in Bright
Horizons Family Solutions Inc. determined that the respondent’s failure to
reply was not a sufficient ground for a finding of bad faith. In another
decision, the respondent transferred the domain name to a Korean
language registrar after the respondent became aware of the
complainant, in an apparent attempt to change the language of the
proceeding from English to Korean. The panel described such conduct as
“improper” and “suggestive of bad faith with regard to the conduct of
these proceedings,” but “not sufficient by itself, to show that the Domain
178

2016

THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS

481

B.   A MINORITY OF DECISIONS: COMPLAINT IS DENIED,
RESPONDENT KEEPS THE DOMAIN NAME (AND SOMETIMES
GETS FINDING OF COMPLAINANT BAD FAITH)
Of the 58 decisions that are included in this study, the
panel denied the complaint in twenty-one of them, thus
allowing the respondents to keep twenty-nine of the eightyone subject domain names,179 for a rate of over 35%.180 This
percentage (albeit taken from a small sample) is significantly
higher than that seen in WIPO-administered UDRP
decisions overall – less than 13%.181 Under paragraph 4(a) of
the Policy, the panel must deny the complainant’s request
for relief when any of the three elements of paragraph 4(a) is
not established.182 The previous discussion referred to some

Name was registered in bad faith.” IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du
Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4,
2008).
179 Some decisions involved more than one domain name; the complaint
was denied with respect to some names, but not in others. See Appendix.
180 The rate of decisions in favor of the respondent for all WIPOadministered decisions involving Korean parties (whether decided by a
sole or three-member panels) is 10.1%. See Lee, supra note 18, at 310.
181 See WIPO Case Outcomes, supra note 12.
182 In some of the twenty-one proceedings, the panel based its decision
on the absence of one of the elements, stating that it was unnecessary to
decide one or both of the other elements. E.g., UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope
Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012)
(stating unnecessary to decide paragraph 4(a)(iii), in light of dispositive
decision on paragraph 4(a)(ii)); Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi,
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of the decisions in which the complaint was denied due to
the complainant’s failure to establish rights in it purported
mark (paragraph 4(a)(i)) or failure to show that the
respondent lacked a right or interest in the domain name
(paragraph 4(a)(ii)).183 In most of the decisions in which the
complaint was denied, thus allowing the respondent to keep
the domain name, the lack of the bad faith element proved
fatal for the complainant. This section discusses the
illustrative bad faith decisions, and the common reasons for
the denial of the complaint under paragraph 4(a)(iii).
One example of a case that lacks bad faith is where
the disputed domain name is registered before the
complainant obtains rights in a mark. In such an instance,
the respondent could not have been aware of the
complainant’s mark, or have an intent to capitalize on it.
Thus, in Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc.,184 where the
respondent registered the domain name <proto.com> three
years before the complainant registered the “PROTO” mark,
and four years before it first used this mark in commerce, the
panel found the bad faith element missing and denied the
complaint. The same result occurred in Deutsche Telekom AG
v. Unitedeurope Consulting, where the panel found that the

WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009) (stating unnecessary to
decide paragraph 4(a)(ii), in light of dispositive decision on paragraph
4(a)(iii)); Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D20060905 (Oct. 10, 2006) (stating unnecessary to decide paragraph 4(a)(i) or
(ii), in light of dispositive decision on paragraph 4(a)(iii)).
183 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay, WIPO Case No.
D2007-1513.
184 WIPO Case No. D2006-0905.
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respondent registered the domain names <t-health.com>, <tportal.com>, and <t-sales.com>, before the complainant filed
applications for registration of its corresponding trademarks,
“T-HEALTH”, “T-PORTAL”, and “T-SALES”.185
Nearly half of the 58 decisions in which the complaint
was denied, and almost all of the decisions where the lack of
the bad faith element was dispositive, involve a domain
name that the respondent urged was generic or descriptive
in nature: <allegretto.com>,186 <brighthorizon.com>,187
<jettour.com>,188 <mornay.com> (“meaning a white
sauce”),189
<neodent.com>,190
<newsrepublic.com>,191
192
<nursefinder.com>,
and <shoulderdoc.com>.193 From
these decisions, common themes emerge relating to whether
the respondent was aware of the complainant or its mark at
the time the respondent registered the domain name.
Specifically, the panel noted that the complainant’s mark

WIPO Case No. D2006-0930 (Dec. 27, 2006).
Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd.,
Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011).
187 Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007).
188 Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May
26, 2006).
189 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008).
190 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013).
191 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089
(Apr. 23, 2014).
192 Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417
(July 5, 2007).
193 Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625
(Sept. 8, 2006).
185
186
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was not particularly distinctive or well-known or had wide
reputation;194 the complainant’s rights in the mark was
limited to its own country or nearby region, and did not
extend to the respondent’s Korea;195 and the respondent had
a plausible reason for registering the domain name.196

JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No.
D2013-1838 (stating, “[T]he Panel finds that the Complainant’s marks are
not fanciful and not marks known widely as unique to its owner (such as
YAHOO or EXXON) but rather an obvious abbreviation for ‘New dental’
in English.”); IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay, WIPO
Case No. D2007-1513 (stating, “Complainant is not so famous, nor is its
MORNAY mark so arbitrary, that the Panel can in the circumstances of
this case assume knowledge of Complainant’s name and mark.”); Bright
Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007) (stating, “The Complainants have provided
no evidence of the nature or extent of their reputation under the mark . .
.”); Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (stating that “the mark
is inherently descriptive, being comprised of common English words”);
Shoulderdoc Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 (referring to mark’s
“relative lack of distinctiveness” and “descriptive nature”); Jet Marques
v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006) (stating
that “there is no evidence of the reputation of the mark extending to
[Korea]” and “[t]he mark may be well known to professionals in the
travel industry in countries outside Europe, but there is no evidence that
the Respondent falls into that category.”).
195 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No.
D2013-1838 (stating, “The Complainant provides no evidence that the
Respondent, who does business only in the Republic of Korea, knew of
the Complainant or its NEODENT marks when the Respondent
registered the disputed domain name . . . .”); Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2007-0417 (stating that “the Complainant’s mark has
demonstrably acquired a distinctive secondary meaning only in the
United States where there Respondent is not located”); Jet Marques,
WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (stating, “The mark is registered only in
Europe. The Respondent appears to be a domain name professional
194
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An illustrative decision incorporating these points is
seen in the proceeding involving the domain name
<allegretto.com>.197 There, the complainant, a German coffee
roaster, commenced a UDRP proceeding against a Korean
manufacturer of “underwear, garments, baby garments,”
and other products.198 The respondent argued that it had
never heard of the complainant or its trademark
“ALLEGRETTO” before the dispute, and that the term is a
common dictionary word meaning “fairly quickly or
briskly,” which the respondent learned when in middle
school.199 The panel agreed with the respondent’s
characterization of the domain name as a “‘dictionary’ term”
and that “‘allegretto’ is not the kind of word/trademark that
can be said to be obviously related to one specific company
or goods/services.”200 The panel also noted that at the time

based in the Republic of Korea, and possibly with business interests in
the United States. There is no evidence of the Respondent carrying on
business in Europe, and no other reason to conclude that the
Respondent’s residence or place of business would, in the ordinary
course of things, have made it aware of the mark.”).
196 Jet Marques, WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (stating that “it is therefore
plausible that the Respondent may have chosen the Domain Name for no
better reason than that it was a relatively short, common word English
expression which had recently become available and was thought to
have some value.”).
197 Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd.,
Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. In assessing whether the complainant’s mark is famous, wellknown, arbitrary, or distinctive, the panel may resort to Internet search
engines. IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong
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of the domain name’s registration, the complainant had only
German trademarks, and that there was no evidence that the
mark was well-known outside of Deutschland. In these
circumstances, where “the respondent has a good faith belief
that the domain name’s value derives from its generic or
descriptive qualities, rather than its specific trademark
value, the use of the domain name consistent with such good
faith belief may be considered use in good faith.”201

Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (stating, “When the
Panel recently conducted a search for MORNAY on ‘www.google.com’
or ‘www.google.co.kr’ from the United States of America[], there was no
reference to Complainant in the first ten pages of results.”).
201 Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (citing
Mobile Commc’n Serv. Inc. v. WebReg, RN, WIPO Case No. D2005-1304
(Feb. 24, 2006); Media Gen. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Rarenames, WebReg,
WIPO Case No. D2006-0964 (Sept. 23, 2006)). In the Heimbs Kaffee GmbH
& Co. KG decision, there appears a description of the respondent’s action
four days after the complainant filed the complaint,
The Panel notes that the Respondent filed the Korean
national trademark application for ALLEGRETTO (fig)
in Class 35 on August 23, 2011, the same day as the
Respondent also transferred <allegretto.com> to a new
Registrar. The Panel cannot draw any other conclusion
than these actions, initiated after the date of the filing of
the Complaint, were not basically done as a result of the
Respondent[’]s serious business activities but rather
indicating a goal to make a dispute resolution case more
difficult to handle for the Complainant (in particular
related to the language of the proceedings).
Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407. The above
discussion precedes the panel’s finding that the respondent had no right
or legitimate interest in the domain name. The panel did not address it in
the context of the respondent’s bad faith. Instead, the panel found that
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For many of the same reasons seen in the cases
involving a generic or descriptive term or phrase discussed
above, panels have found that bad faith was not established
in cases involving a domain name with two or three letter
acronyms or abbreviations: <hsm.com>202 and <rb.net>.203 In
both cases, the panel found that the complainant satisfied
the requirement under paragraph 4(a)(i) that it had rights
(through use, registration, or both) in the mark to which the
domain name was identical or confusingly similar: “HSM”
(along with “HSMONLINE”, “HSMEDUCATION”, and
“HSM MANAGEMENTV”) for services “in the field of
executive education”;204 and “RB” (the two letters resulting
from “the merger of the UK Company Reckitt & Colman plc
and the Dutch group Benckiser N.V.”205) for “commercial
activities in the household, health care and personal care
sectors.”206 (The complaint in a third case, involving the
domain name <utv.com> and the corresponding mark
“UTV” (originating from Ulster Television) for “television
and radio broadcasting services and entertainment,” among
others, was denied not under the bad faith element, but due

the complainant failed to prove both bad faith registration and bad faith
use, and denied the complaint.
202 HSM Argentina S.A. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017
(May 1, 2007).
203 Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239
(May 20, 2009).
204 HSM Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017.
205 Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (emphasis added).
206 Id.
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to the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the domain
name.207)
In all three of the decisions, the panel determined that
there was no evidence to show that the respondent was
aware of the complainant at the time of the domain name
registration,208 and noted the related points of the
complainant’s weak or unknown mark,209 the geographic

UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case
No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012).
208 Id.; Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239; HSM Argentina
S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017.
209 UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “The Panel did,
however, not find any evidence in support of the Complainant’s
allegations of the Trademark’s strong reputation . . . .”; “[t]he disputed
domain name typically is such a short term which may represent many
acronyms.”; and “the disputed domain name is merely a generic short
acronym in which the Respondent has a legitimate interest to use.”);
Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (stating, “‘RB’ has, as
most other two-letter-acronyms, various meanings and is not only
referring to the Complainant.”; “proof has not been established that the
Complainant itself, as a company, is well-known under the acronym ‘RB’
(the website at ‘http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RB’, providing
information on different meanings of ‘RB’, does not mention the
Complainant).”); HSM Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017
(stating, “This evidence suggests that the combination of the letters ‘hsm’
may have a number of potential associations, unconnected with the
Complainant.”; “the Panel stops short of finding that the Complainant or
its marks are famous. The Complainant appears to be well-known in its
field. But that field (‘executive education’) appears specific and defined.
The Panel does not make the finding that the Complainant was, when
the disputed domain name was registered, so generally well-known that
the Respondent must have been aware of it.”).
207
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separation of the complainant from Korea,210 and a plausible
reason for the respondent registering the domain name.211
In a UDRP proceeding, the successful complainant
receives a panel decision directing cancellation of the
disputed domain name or its transfer to the complainant.
For the respondent, a denial of the complaint is the only
result in its favor. In certain circumstances, however, the
panel may issue a further vindication of the respondent and
an affirmative rebuke against the complainant. “Reverse
domain name hijacking” is defined under the UDRP Rules

UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “This could have been
different if the Complainant’s claim that that the Trademark has a strong
reputation and is widely known outside the (Northern) Ireland region,
and – as the Complainant implied – more particularly in Republic of
Korea where the Respondent is located . . . is true, as in such case the
Respondent would have registered and used the disputed domain name
with the actual knowledge of the Trademark and may have been using
the disputed domain name in bad faith.”; “the Panel is of the opinion
that the Respondent who is located in Republic of Korea cannot
reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the Trademark which has
only been used in United Kingdom and Ireland.”); Reckitt Benckiser Plc,
WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (stating, “The Complainant has neither
demonstrated business activities in the Republic of Korea in the year
2000, when the disputed domain name was registered, nor contended
that it was well known in the Republic of Korea then . . . .”); HSM
Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017 (stating, “[T]he Respondent
is resident in the Republic of Korea, while the Complainant is based in
Argentina and its marks are registered principally in the Americas and
the EU. The Complainant did not provide evidence of operating or
having registered marks in the Republic of Korea.”).
211 UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “The disputed domain
name typically is such a short term which may represent many
acronyms.”; “the disputed domain name is merely a generic short
acronym in which the Respondent has a legitimate interest to use.”).
210
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as “using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a
registered domain-name holder of a domain name.”212
Another provision of the rules elaborates on the panel’s
authority to make a finding of reverse domain name
hijacking (and re-emphasizes the bad faith component):
If after considering the submissions the Panel
finds that the complaint was brought in bad
faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse
Domain Name Hijacking or was brought
primarily to harass the domain-name holder,
the Panel shall declare in its decision that the
complaint was brought in bad faith and
constitutes an abuse of the administrative
proceeding.213
In contrast to bad faith on the part of the respondent
under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, with non-exhaustive
examples provided in paragraph 4(b), neither the Policy nor
the UDRP Rules offer any further guidance on the

UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 15(e). Perhaps the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse
domain name hijacking in a UDRP proceeding is the closest equivalent
to the defendant’s counterclaim in a civil action. One panel noted that
the respondent has the burden of proving bad faith in the filing of the
complaint. Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2006-0905 (Oct. 10, 2006). If reverse domain name hijacking is a
sanction against the complainant, it is a symbolic one. Another panel
stated, “As the Rules do not provide for monetary remedies or specific
relief in such a case [as described in paragraph 15(e)], a finding of
reverse domain name hijacking would be of limited value to the
Respondent.” Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007).
212
213
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complainant’s bad faith in bringing a complaint for purposes
of a reverse domain name hijacking determination. Panels
have stated that a finding of reverse domain name hijacking
is warranted when “the complainant in fact knew or clearly
should have known at the time that it filed the complaint
that it could not prove one of the essential elements required
by the UDRP,”214 or when “the face of the complaint itself
demonstrates a settled reason why the complaint must be
denied.”215 But a “mere lack of success of the Complaint is
not of itself sufficient.”216 The determination of reverse
domain name hijacking “is always within the panel’s
discretion,” and even where the facts may justify such a
finding, the panel may choose instead “to leave the parties
as it found them.”217 Of the twenty-one decisions herein in

JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting WIPO Overview 2.0,
supra note 26, ¶ 4.17). See Witmer Pub. Safety Grp. Inc. v. Kwang pyo
Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011) (“[O]ne who brings a
complaint, knowing that it will not be able to prove one or more of the
elements set out in the Policy or recklessly indifferent as to whether it
will be able to prove its case or not, runs a very real risk of . . . a finding
[of reverse domain name hijacking] being made against it.”) (Brown,
Pan., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
215 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No.
D2013-1838 (citing Mile, Inc. v. Michael Burg, WIPO Case No. D20102011 (Feb. 7, 2011); Liquid Nutrition Inc. v. liquidnutrition.com/Vertical
Axis Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-1598 (Jan. 28, 2008)).
216 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905 (citing Deutsche Post
AG v. NJDomains, WIPO Case No. D2006-0001 (Mar. 1, 2006)).
217 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No.
D2013-1838 (quoting Rudy Rojas v. Gary Davis, WIPO Case No. D20041081 (Apr. 18, 2005)).
214
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which the complaint was denied, the panel found reverse
domain name hijacking in three of them.218
In the proceeding involving the domain name
<proto.com>, the panel stated that it was unnecessary to
address the first two elements of paragraph 4(a), given the
panel’s “fundamental finding” that the complainant failed to
establish the respondent’s bad faith.219 Here, the respondent
registered the domain name years before the complainant
filed its application for trademark registration and began
using the mark.220 Thus, in these circumstances, the
respondent could not have been aware of the complainant’s
mark, and could not have acted in bad faith in registering
the domain name.221 The panel found reverse domain name
hijacking and declared that the complaint was brought in
bad faith and was an abuse of the Policy: “The Panel
considers that the Complainant is represented by Counsel
who even on a rudimentary examination of the Policy and
its[] application in this area should have appreciated that the
Complaint could not succeed . . . .”222 The panel’s cautionary
language on the cavalier resort to a UDRP proceeding is
worthy of note:
Initiating domain name dispute resolution
proceedings necessarily involves putting the
parties to a considerable expenditure of time

Id.; Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008); Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D20060905.
219 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905.
220 See supra text accompanying note 184.
221 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905.
222 Id.
218
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and in many cases cost and the Policy must not
be used unless the complainant has a
reasonable and credible belief it is entitled to
succeed. In particular, proceedings must not be
commenced in a brash and totally unjustifiable
attempt to pressure a domain name owner into
releasing a legitimately held domain name that
considerably pre-dates any trademark rights
held by the complainant.223
In the decision involving the domain name
<gopets.net>,224 the respondent had previously registered the
mark GOPETS. Ten months before the subject UDRP
proceeding, the respondent commenced an action against
the complainant in the U.S. district court, seeking transfer of
the domain name <gopets.com> from the complainant.225
Five weeks before the complainant filed its UDRP complaint,
the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the
complainant “on the grounds that the Respondent would be
‘likely to succeed on the merits of its service mark
infringement claim.’”226 The panel emphasized the court’s
statement that “‘the law is clear that ownership of a domain
name alone does not confer any rights to a trademark in the

Id. (citing Sustainable Forestry Mgmt. Ltd. v. SFM.com, WIPO Case
No. D2002-0535 (Sept. 13, 2002)).
224 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008).
225 GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX (C.D. Cal. Mar.
2007).
226 Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091 (quoting GoPets Ltd.,
No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX).
223
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same name.’”227 Thus, the complainant was on notice that it
could not establish any rights in its mark, under paragraph
4(a)(i). The panel added that the complainant’s case was
“similarly fatally weak” with respect to the respondent’s
right or interest in the domain name and the bad faith
element.228 A majority of the panel found reverse domain
name hijacking,229 stating, “The Complainant should have
known its case was fatally weak. . . . It seems plain that the
Complainant, had it properly understood what was
required, would have understood that it could not make its
case.”230 The panel also cautioned the complainant and
prospective complainants:
It is also notable that [WIPO] provides a
substantial amount of information on its

Id.
Id.
229 One panelist dissented on the finding. For a discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 273-75.
230 Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091. The complainant also
lost in the court action. The district court’s partial summary judgment in
favor of the respondent concluded that the complainant’s use of the
domain name <gopets.com> violated the respondent’s rights under the
Lanham Act. The court of appeals affirmed this and other portions of the
judgment in favor of the respondent, but reversed and remanded on one
of the respondent’s claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and the district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011).
On remand, the only issue before the district court was the matter of
attorneys’ fees. Emphasizing the complainant’s “bad faith and
willfulness,” the court awarded the respondent fees in the amount of
$40,335. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX, 2012 WL
3962789, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir.
2015).
227
228
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website, to fully inform parties about
conducting disputes under the Policy. This
includes a model Complaint, which the
Complainant in this case has used. The notes
embedded in that model Complaint relevantly
instruct a complainant to “specify the
trademark(s) or service mark(s) on which the
Complaint is based and, for each mark,
describe the goods or services, if any, in
connection with which the mark is used.” This
was evidently a part of that template which the
Complainant ignored.231
Finally, in the decision challenging the domain name
<neodent.com>, the panel stated that it “need look no
further than the Complaint to determine that the
Complainant has not established that the Respondent
registered the disputed domain name in bad faith.”232
Indeed, the panel did not address the first two elements of
paragraph 4(a), other than referring to the parties’
contentions relating to them. As discussed above, the panel
determined that there was no evidence that the respondent,
“who does business only in the Republic of Korea, knew of
the Complainant or its NEODENT marks when the
Respondent registered the domain name in 2002, five years
before the Complainant obtained its Korean trademark, or of
facts that might support an inference of knowledge.”233 The

Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091.
JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013).
233 Id.
231
232
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panel rejected the complainant’s argument regarding
constructive notice of the mark’s registration and “renown”
of the mark.234
Declaring that a finding of reverse domain name
hijacking was appropriate, the panel relied on three reasons.
First, the panel was critical of the complainant, represented
by counsel, for disregarding the “longstanding rule of
decision in Policy proceedings” that rejects the U.S. doctrine
of constructive notice for UDRP proceedings, at least where
non-U.S. parties are involved. “The Complainant offers the
Panel no reason why in this proceeding the Panel should
depart from or modify settled Policy precedent.”235 Second,
the complainant committed “a more serious pleading
error.”236 Given that there was evidence (in both Korean and
English) that the respondent operated a dental clinic in
Korea under the name “NEO Dental Clinic” from twelve
years before the filing of the complaint, the panel stated that
the complainant “could and should have verified” its
allegation in the complaint that the respondent “has never
been known by the disputed domain name.”237 The panel
described the pleading as “misleading to the point of
attempting to deceive the Panel.”238 “Third, the

Id.
Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. The panel explained, “This alone has been held grounds for finding
RDNH.” Id. (citing Timbermate Prods. Pty Ltd. v. Domains by Proxy,
LLC/Barry Gork, WIPO Case No. D2013-1603 (Nov. 3, 2013); Coöperatie
Univé U.A. v. Ashantiplc Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-0636) (June 30,
2011)).
234
235
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Complainant’s basic theory of its case raises issues far
outside the limited jurisdiction and competence of a UDRP
panel, and the Complainant or its representative should
have known it.”239
In another decision, involving the domain name
<newsrepublic.com>, the panel noted that the complainant
failed “even to make a prima facie case showing that the
Respondent lacks right or legitimate interest”240 and also
failed to establish the bad faith element.241 In denying the
complaint, the panel added in a footnote, “[T]he Panel
unanimously finds the allegations and evidence of [the]
Complainant to be seriously inadequate to establish a
successful case.”242 The panel’s words that follow sound of
the cautionary language seen in previous decisions where
reverse domain name hijacking was found: “The Panel
wishes to remind Complainant that, under the Policy, the
responsibility rests on Complainant to fully comprehend the
Policy and to provide sufficient legal allegations to establish
its rights, along with evidence to support such
allegations.”243 Nevertheless, there was no mention of
reverse domain name hijacking in the decision, nor did the
respondent request it.244

Id.
Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089
(Apr. 23, 2014).
241 Id.
242 Id. n.6.
243 Id.
244 The panel declined the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse
domain name hijacking in five decisions. The panel offered its reasons
for doing so in the following three decisions, where it had denied the
complaint:
239
240
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Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co,
Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17,
2011) (“In this present case, the Complainant 1) has in
fact a valid trademark registration for ALLEGRETTO
dated earlier than the registration of the disputed
domain name, and 2) found the disputed domain name
identical to its trademark, and used only on a website
indicating that the domain name was for sale. It is the
Panel’s view that the Complainant, not having all facts
and arguments, had understandable reasons to file the
Complaint.”);
Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007) (“[T]he Complainant holds
registered marks that are nearly identical to the Domain
Name and has used the NURSEFINDERS mark for more
than thirty years. The Complaint was advanced with
ultimately unpersuasive claims, but there is no
indication that the Complaint was brought to harass the
Respondent as a competitor. Moreover, this Respondent
was found to have acted in bad faith in some of the
earlier UDRP proceedings in which it was involved.
Thus, while the Complainant has failed to establish all of
the elements of a Policy complaint, the Panel does not
conclude that the Complainant initiated this proceeding
in bad faith.”);
Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No.
D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009) (“In the present case, where
the Complainant owns if limited common law trade
mark rights identical to the second level domain name,
there is no room for a reverse domain name hijacking
order.”).
In two other decisions, the respondent requested a finding of
reverse domain name hijacking, but the panel ruled in favor of the
complainant and ordered a transfer of the domain name. Samsung Elecs.
Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630 (Feb. 16, 2010);

2016
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THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

The similarities between arbitration and the UDRP
proceeding continue to the decision stage. A decision by any
three-member tribunal requires deliberations within the
collective body. UDRP decisions are no exception. Like the
rules of most arbitral organizations, the Policy, the UDRP
Rules, and the WIPO Supplemental Rules do not provide
any mention of, or guidance on, the panel’s internal
deliberations. As with many arbitration cases involving
multi-member panels, the manner and extent of the UDRP
panel’s deliberation is entirely up to its members.245

SMS Demag AG v. Seung Gon, Kim, WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (Jan.
19, 2001).
245 Because UDRP proceedings generally have no in-person hearings,
internal deliberations will most likely be by electronic means. Given the
international composition of many UDRP panels (which is the case in all
of the 58 decisions), deliberations would be necessary especially where
party submissions and portions of the case record are in a language in
which an individual panelist may not have proficiency, requiring
summaries of translations or similar assistance by another member of the
panel with proficiency in that language. Of the 58 proceedings, the panel
in the following seven included at least one non-Korean panelist, where
the decision was published in Korean. (The nationality of the nonKorean panelist is indicated, per the guidelines provided in the
Appendix.) News Corp. v. Yoon Jinsu, WIPO Case No. D2005-0504 (Aug.
5, 2005) (Ricketson, Australia); NBC Universal, Inc. v. Junak Kwon,
WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec. 23, 2004) (Barker, New Zealand);
Societe Air France v. Daung Soo Ghim, WIPO Case No. D2003-0891 (Feb.
13, 2003) (Vivant, France); Produits Berger v. Pil Technlogy Korea Ltd.,
WIPO Case No. D2003-0192 (May 31, 2003) (Bensoussan, France); Konica
Corp. v. [Jin Hee Lee], WIPO Case No. D2003-0101 (May 23, 2003)
(Limbury, Great Britain/Australia); Societe Nationale de Television
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With respect to the tribunal’s ultimate decision, the
rules of the leading arbitral organizations require that the
award be in writing and state the reasons upon which the
award is based.246 These rules also acknowledge the
possibility of a divided vote and decision by a majority.247
Identical provisions appear in the UDRP Rules: “The Panel’s
decision shall be in writing, provide the reasons on which it
is based . . . .”;248 and “[i]n the case of a three-member Panel,
the Panel’s decision shall be made by a majority.”249 While
some arbitration administering organizations do not address
explicitly the matter of the dissenting opinion, the UDRP

France3 v. [Segwon Kim], WIPO Case No. D2002-1181 (May 9, 2003)
(Dreyfus, France); Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. [Suh Jung Gohn],
WIPO Case No. D2002-0368 (Sept. 6, 2002) (Hunter, Australia; U.S.).
AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art. 30(1); ICC Rules, supra note 54, art.
31(2); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.2. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra
note 54, art. 34(2) & (3). Some organizations provide that the parties may
agree that no reasons are to be given. AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art.
30(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.2. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra
note 54, art. 34(3).
246

AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art. 29(2); ICC Rules, supra note 54, art.
31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.5. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra
note 54, art. 33(1). Some rules provide that where there is no majority,
the president or presiding arbitrator makes the decision. ICC Rules, supra
note 54, art. 31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.5.
247

248
249

UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 15(d).
Id. ¶ 15(c).
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framework contemplates the possibility of the dissenting
opinion and addresses it squarely.250
In international arbitration, there has been significant
discussion regarding the utility of dissenting opinions.251
Alan Redfern, among others, is critically opposed to the
practice:
[F]irst, . . . they may inhibit that open
discussion which ought to take place secretly
and within the confines of the arbitral tribunal.
Secondly, . . . they may cast doubts on the
correctness or validity of the award made by
the majority. Thirdly, . . . they do not serve to
advance the development of the law, since
there is no doctrine of precedence in
arbitrations and, in general no appeal against

“Panel decisions and dissenting opinions shall normally comply with
the guidelines as to length set forth in the Provider’s Supplemental
Rules. Any dissenting opinion shall accompany the majority decision.”
Id. ¶ 15(e). The UDRP prescription that a dissenting opinion “shall
accompany the majority decision” is perhaps included in light of the
general understanding in arbitration that a dissenting opinion is not part
of the award. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 389 (4th ed. 2004); Peter J.
Rees QC & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can They Fulfil a Beneficial
Role?, 25 ARB. INT’L 329, 333 (2009). The UDRP rule avoids the (one
hopes) rare situation in arbitration where the dissenting opinion surfaces
after the award is issued, sometimes without the knowledge of the
majority or the administering organization, when the dissenter reveals
the opinion to the losing party.
251 For a summary, see Ilhyung Lee, Introducing International Commercial
Arbitration and Its Lawlessness, by Way of the Dissenting Opinion, 4
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 19 (2011), and citations therein.
250
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the award of an arbitral tribunal and no open
publication of that tribunal’s award.252
Others argue that a proper dissent can be beneficial.253
Although the UDRP process borrows much from the
arbitration method, given some of the differences between
the two (mainly that the UDRP decision is not necessarily
binding), the reasons for opposing a dissent in arbitration do
not transfer perfectly to the UDRP setting. With respect to
WIPO-administered decisions particularly, note the
provider’s understanding that “with UDRP decisions
covering a multitude of facts and arguments, genuine
differences of opinion may be difficult to avoid on particular
issues, all the more so where panelists and parties come
from a multitude of jurisdictions. Moreover, these opinions
must be formed in the context of a rapidly evolving Domain
Name System and Internet.”254

Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields Lecture – Dissenting Opinions in
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20
ARB. INT’L 223, 240 (2004); see REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 250, at 39192.
253 Richard M. Mosk, The Debate Over Dissenting and Concurring Opinions
in International Arbitration, 26 UWLA L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1995) (stating that
dissenting, as well as concurring, opinions “should be allowed in
international arbitration and are useful” and “can be “influential” and “a
source of legal reasoning”). See Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg,
Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT
BROMS 259, 283 (Matt Tupamäki ed., 1999) (“Dissenting opinions can
improve the legitimacy and performance of international arbitration, and
thus offer significant benefits that offset the risks posed.”).
254 WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26 (prefatory text).
252
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WIPO also notes that although “[t]he UDRP does not
operate on a strict doctrine of precedent”255 and prior
decisions are not binding on panelists,256 the organization
apparently desires to “maximize the consistency” of the
UDRP system,257 one that operates in a “predictable manner
for all parties.”258 As one commentator noted, “[T]he UDRP
has in effect given rise to a new system of international
common law, with panelists increasingly citing to, and relying
upon, previous UDRP decisions.”259 Over time, “consensus
or clear majority views”260 may emerge. Along the way,
well-reasoned dissenting statements by individual panelists
may provoke thought and prompt deliberative discussion
within the international pool of panelists, and perhaps serve
as the basis for sound majority rules in the future.261
From the 58 decisions herein, there are ten in which
disagreement within the panel is noted from the text of the
publicly available decision. Of these ten:

Id. ¶ 4.1. (“What deference is owed to past UDRP decisions dealing
with similar factual matters or legal issues?”)
256 Id. (prefatory text).
257 Id.
258 Id. ¶ 4.1. (“What deference is owed to past UDRP decisions dealing
with similar factual matters or legal issues?”). “[P]redictability remains a
key element of dispute resolution systems . . . .” Id. (prefatory text).
259 Sorkin, supra note 18, at 43 (citing David G. Post, Juries and the UDRP,
ICANN WATCH (Sept. 6, 2000),
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm)
(emphasis added)).
260 WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26 (prefatory text).
261 It was apparently the concern that future panelists may be persuaded
by the dissent in Guru Denim Inc. v. Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim Abu-Harb, WIPO
Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27, 2013), that prompted in the commentary
a rousing defense of the majority’s approach. See Cyberlaw, supra note 34.
255
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•   Two are not on the merits of the decision. One
relates to the necessity of making a finding on the
first element of paragraph 4(a), given the
dispositive nature of the panel’s finding on the
bad faith element; the other is a dissent from the
majority’s determination of the proper language of
the proceeding.
•   One decision includes a panelist’s dissent from the
majority’s finding of reverse domain name
hijacking.
•   Another decision records a dissent from the
majority’s refusal to find reverse domain name
hijacking. The same decision is also noteworthy in
that the panel’s unanimous decision denying the
complaint attaches two concurring opinions.
•   The remaining six decisions see an individual
panelist’s dissent from the ultimate outcome of the
dispute.
We turn to the decisions.
A.   ELEMENTS, LANGUAGE, RDNH
In the proceeding involving the domain name
<shoulderdoc.com>, the panel denied the complaint on the
ground that the complainant failed to establish the required
bad faith element of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.262 The
panel stated that in view of its conclusion regarding the bad

Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625
(Sept. 8, 2006).
262
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faith element, it was not necessary to make a finding
regarding the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the
domain name. Regarding the first element, concerning
identical or confusing similarity to a mark in which the
complainant has rights, the majority of the panel decided
that the complainant’s use of its own domain name
<shoulderdoc.co.uk> was sufficient to establish common
law rights in a mark.263 But “[o]ne member of the Panel
would decline to reach a finding on this question, on the
ground that the Panel’s finding as to bad faith is dispositive
of the present matter.”264 That member of the panel is not
identified, and there is no separate opinion or further
elaboration.
A disagreement regarding the proper language of the
proceeding brought a separate opinion in NBC Universal, Inc.
v. Junak Kwon.265 There, the U.S. complainants challenged the
Korean respondent’s registration and use of the domain
name <nbcuniversal.com>. The panel unanimously
determined that the complainants satisfied the requisite
three elements of paragraph 4(a), and ordered the transfer of
the domain name to the complainants. The panel’s decision
was in Korean, with two of the panelists deciding that
Korean was the language of the proceeding. The non-Korean
panelist disagreed on this point.266
Given the possibility of parties from different
countries and languages coming together in a domain name

Id.
Id.
265 WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec. 23, 2004) [in Korean].
266 Id. (Opinion of Sir Ian Barker).
263
264
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dispute, the UDRP Rules specifically address the question of
the language of the proceeding:
11.
Language of Proceedings
(a)  Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, or
specified otherwise in the Registration
Agreement,
the
language
of
the
administrative proceeding shall be the
language of the Registration Agreement,
subject to the authority of the Panel to
determine otherwise, having regard to the
circumstances
of
the
administrative
proceeding.
(b)  The Panel may order that any documents
submitted in languages other than the
language of the administrative proceeding
be accompanied by a translation in whole
or in part into the language of the
administrative proceeding.267
In the <nbcuniversal.com> decision, the complainants filed
the complaint in English on the belief that the registration
agreement was in English. After the registrar advised WIPO
that the registration agreement was in Korean, WIPO
ordered the complainants to submit a Korean translation of
the complaint, to which the complainants complied.268 The
respondent did not file a response. The majority of the panel
stated that under paragraph 11, the availability of the

UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 11.
Over the years, WIPO’s practice in such circumstances has evolved.
See Lee, supra note 18.
267
268
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registration agreement in English (as well as in Korean) and
the complainant’s lack of fluency in Korean were not
sufficient reasons to depart from the language of the
registration agreement. The majority also noted that the
respondent used the English language only briefly for its
website and that the procedures for the respondent to follow
were spelled out in Korean. Thus, the majority declared that
the decision would be in Korean.269 Panelist Sir Ian Barker
filed a separate opinion, stating, “I respectfully disagree with
the opinion of the majority that Korean should be the
language of the proceedings,” and offered “the following
reasons that require English.
(a)  The Respondent demonstrated some facility with
the English language in his email communications
to the Center.
(b)  The disputed domain name includes a word in the
English language (universal) and clearly relates to
companies in an English-speaking country.
(c)   The content on the Respondent’s website is in
English and shows that he may communicate his
views in that language.
(d)  The fact that the Respondent has filed no response
even to the Korean complaint.270

NBC Universal, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2004-0764.
Id. (Opinion of Sir Ian Barker). On the merits, Panelist Barker wrote, “I
agree with the majority that the complaint be allowed and transfer of the
Disputed Domain Name ordered. I have been supplied with a translation
of the operative part of the decision by the Presiding Panelist and I agree
with it.” Id. The case appears to be one of the few in which the text of the
decision reveals that a particular panelist was included in the list
provided by one of the parties. Panelist Barker stated that he was chosen
269
270
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Panelist Barker relied on prior UDRP decisions with similar
circumstances in which the panel decided to depart from the
Korean language of the registration agreement and to
proceed in English.271
As noted above, in the decision involving the domain
name <gopets.net>,272 the panel unanimously denied the
complaint based on its conclusion that the complainant
failed to meet any of the three requirements under
paragraph 4(a), with particular attention to the
complainant’s failure to show any rights in a relevant
trademark. A majority of the panel also found reverse
domain name hijacking against the complainant, reasoning
that there was “sufficient evidence that the Complainant
brought the Complaint either deliberately knowing of its
flaws, or that it should have been aware of them.”273 The
decision continues, “One Panelist, however, considers that
the Complainant should be given the benefit of the doubt on
this point, since it is unrepresented by counsel. On this
alternative, it is possible that the Complainant simply
misunderstood the scope of the Policy.”274 The panelist is not
identified, and there is no separate opinion. The dissenter’s
position would be defensible under the guidelines, offered

as a panelist by WIPO from a list of three provided by the complainant.
Id.
271 Id. (citations omitted).
272 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No.
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008).
273 Id.
274 Id.
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by a later panel decision within the 58, that a determination
of reverse domain name hijacking “is always within the
panel’s discretion,” and even where the evidence indicates
that the complainant used the proceeding in bad faith and in
an attempt to deprive the respondent of its domain name,
the panel may choose “to leave the parties as it found
them.”275

B.   THREE OPINIONS, TWO CONCURRING, ONE
IN PART

DISSENTING

The result in Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. v. Kwang
pyo Kim,276 may well be the UDRP’s version of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. United
States.277 In New York Times Co., the Court rejected the
government’s request to enjoin two newspapers from
publishing the “Pentagon Papers.”278 The Court’s decision
included a per curiam opinion, and nine separate opinions,
one by each member of the Court – six concurring279 and

JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim,
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting Rudy Rojas v. Gary
Davis, WIPO Case No. D2004-1081 (Apr. 18, 2005)).
276 WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011).
277 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
278 Id.
279 Id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 724 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 727 (Stewart. J., concurring); id. at
730 (White, J., concurring); id. at 740 (Marshall, J., concurring).
275
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three dissenting.280 In Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc., the
panel denied the complaint, but that was the only issue on
which the three panelists were unanimous.281 The decision
signed by the presiding panelist is followed by another
panelist’s concurring opinion offering different grounds for
denying the complaint.282 These two panelists also formed a
majority to deny the respondent’s request for a finding of
reverse domain name hijacking. The third panelist’s separate
opinion concurred with the decision to deny the complaint
on grounds virtually identical to those of the presiding
panelist, but dissented from the majority’s refusal to find
reverse domain name hijacking.283
The respondent in Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc.
registered the domain name <firestore.com> on December
24, 1999. From 2001 to 2008, the domain name resolved to a
website that offered electronic goods for sale.284 The website
was later changed, and, at the time of the UDRP proceeding,
was “a referral website featuring pay-per-click links to other
websites promoting and selling firefighting equipment and
related goods.”285 The complainant was a U.S. company
based in Pennsylvania that – beginning from 1999 – sold
equipment and supplies to fire, police, “EMS,” and military
personnel, under the trademark “thefirestore.com”. In
September 2006, the complainant applied to register the

Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id.
at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
281 WIPO Case No. D2011-0075.
282 Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring).
283 Id. (Brown, Pan., concurring).
284 Id. (Pan. Decision).
285 Id.
280
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mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and
received registration in January 2008.286
Presiding Panelist Gabriela Kennedy “accept[ed] that
the
Complainant
presently
has
rights
in
the
‘the[]firestore.com’ trade mark” based on its registration in
2008.287 She wrote that although the complainant obtained
the trademark registration after the respondent registered the
domain name, “Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy does not
require that the Complainant show it had rights in the trade
mark at the time that the Disputed Domain Name was
registered, but rather it merely requires that such right exists
at the time of filing the Complaint.”288 Completing the
discussion of the first element, the presiding panelist found
that the domain name <firestore.com> was confusingly
similar to the complainant’s mark “thefirestore.com”.289
Turning to the second element of the respondent’s right or

Id.
Id.
288 Id. (citing Digital Vision, Ltd. v. Advanced Chemill Sys., WIPO Case
No. D2001-0827 (Sept. 23, 2001); Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. [] Vertical
Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007)). She added:
286
287

Whether the Complainant had rights in the trade mark
at the time of registration of the Disputed Domain Name
may be relevant to the consideration of bad faith under
paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, but it is not relevant for
the purposes of determining whether the Disputed
Domain Name is confusingly similar to a trade mark in
which the Complainant has rights.
Id.
289

Id.
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interest in the domain name, the presiding panelist agreed
with the respondent’s view that the domain name was of a
descriptive nature and that there was no evidence to show
that the respondent knew of the complainant’s mark.
Accordingly, the presiding panelist found that the
complainant failed to establish the second element.
Although the complaint failed on this ground, and it was not
necessary to address the bad faith element, the presiding
panelist thought “it fit to look at the third requirement” in
light of the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse
domain name hijacking.290
Presiding Panelist Kennedy emphasized that
paragraph 4(a)(iii) imposed a “conjunctive requirement,”
necessitating proof of both bad faith registration and bad
faith use. With respect to bad faith registration, she noted
that “[b]y the Complainant’s own admission, the
Respondent did not register the Disputed Domain Name in
bad faith.”291 Moreover, the presiding panelist pointed out
that the complainant did not have a trademark registration
for “thefirestore.com” when the respondent registered the
domain name; there was insufficient evidence to show that
the complainant had common law rights in the mark at the
time the domain name was registered; and given that the
domain name “consisted of descriptive generic terms,” there
was no evidence that the complainant’s mark “obtained any
great degree of fame or secondary meaning” before the
domain name was registered, “certainly none that extended

290
291

Id.
Id.
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to South Korea, where the Respondent resides.”292 Thus, the
presiding panelist noted, the complainant could not have
satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii). She did state, however, that the
respondent’s recent use of the domain name for a website
that included links to the complainant’s competitors was
“suggestive of bad faith.”293 Regarding reverse domain name
hijacking, Presiding Panelist Kennedy wrote that “the
Complainant had an arguable case at least,” and declined to
find that the complaint “was frivolous or that it was filed
merely to harass the Respondent.”294
Panelist Jonathan Hudis filed a concurring opinion.
To him, the “fatal flaw” in the complainant’s case was its
“lack of proof of priority” in the mark.295 “The Complainant
has not shown that it possessed registered or common law
trade mark rights in ‘TheFireStore.com’ prior to the
Respondent’s registration of the Disputed Domain
Name.”296 According to Panelist Hudis, the complaint failed
on that ground alone, and presumably, it was unnecessary to
address the latter two elements of paragraph 4(a). His
opinion continues, however. He described the respondent’s
re-tasked website, which directed Internet users to the
complainant’s competitors, as “objectionable use” and
“progressive encroachment,” and determined that the
respondent did not have a right or legitimate interest in the
domain name.297 The panelist also stated that the

Id.
Id.
294 Id.
295 Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring).
296 Id.
297 Id.
292
293
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respondent’s use of the domain name “arguably, cause[d]
confusion,” and was “arguably infringing” and “arguably . .
. bad faith use.”298 Regarding the bad faith element, the
panelist wrote:
I further depart from that part of the Presiding
Panelist’s opinion stating that it is unnecessary
to discuss bad faith (in view of the
Complainant’s failure to prevail under
paragraphs 4(a)(i) or 4(a)(ii) of the Policy),[299]
and then devote a whole section of the decision
to bad faith. To this Panelist, such a circular
approach makes no sense.300
Finally, Panelist Hudis agreed wholly with the presiding
panelist’s decision against a finding of reverse domain name
hijacking.301
The Honorable Neil Brown Q.C. filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Regarding the first
element, he concurred with the presiding panelist that the
complainant satisfied the requirements therein. He wrote, “It
is sometimes said that for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i)
of the Policy, a complainant need satisfy only a

Id.
To clarify, the presiding panelist determined that the complainant
satisfied the element in paragraph 4(a)(i), but not (ii). Panelist Hudis
would have found that the complainant did not satisfy (i), but did satisfy
(ii). Id.
300 Id. “Moreover, . . . I do not wish to enter the debate whether any
complainant needs to prove bad faith use and registration to establish its
case under the Policy.” Id.
301 Id.
298
299
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comparatively low threshold. Thus, for example, the
prevailing view seems to be that a complainant need only
show that it has a trade mark at the time the complaint is
filed.”302 Regarding the respondent’s right or interest in the
domain name, Panelist Brown concurred with the presiding
panelist “for the reasons given” that the complainant did not
satisfy this element. He likewise concurred with the
presiding panelist that there was no bad faith registration.
Nonetheless, departing from the presiding panelist
regarding bad faith use, he wrote, “[T]he Complainant has
not satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy in so far as it
relates to bad faith use.”303
Panelist Brown disagreed with the majority’s decision
declining to find reverse domain name hijacking, in a
strongly worded dissent:

302

Id. (Brown, Pan., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He added:
Accordingly, it may be the case that the Complainant in
the present proceedings has satisfied the requirement of
paragraph 4(a)(i) as a matter of literal interpretation of
the Policy, for it “has” trademark rights, even if it did
not have them when the Disputed Domain Name was
registered. But it should be noted that its trademark
rights are weak and will not allow it to prevail in these
proceedings. That is so because the trademark in
question was not applied for until 7 years after the
Disputed Domain Name was registered and was not
issued until 9 years after the Disputed Domain Name
was registered. As such, it is clear that the trademark
relied on will not enable a finding that the Disputed
Domain Name was registered in bad faith.

Id.
303

Id.
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In the present case, it is clear that there was no
ground for filing the complaint and that this
was known to the Complainant. That is so
because the Complainant has made the
unusual but frank admission that the domain
name was not registered in bad faith. That
being so, the Complainant must have been
fixed with knowledge, at the time it filed the
Complaint, that it would not be able to prove
one of the elements required to be proved,
namely that within the meaning of paragraph
4(a)(iii), the Disputed Domain Name had not
only been used in bad faith, but had been
registered in bad faith. That, by itself, is a
ground for making a finding of reverse domain
name hijacking.304

304

Id. He also added:
[T]here is an air of unreality about the Complainant’s
case of which it must have been aware. It has its own
website, “www.thefirestore.com” and the domain name
leading to that website is clearly <thefirestore.com>. A
search shows that the domain name is registered in the
name Jeff Smith Private Registration and that it was
registered on August 12, 1999. Despite this privacy
registration, it is apparent that the Complainant made a
conscious decision to register, not <firestore.com>,
which it could have registered, but <thefirestore.com>. It
seems unreal for it to claim 11 years later that the
Respondent has no right to and registered in bad faith a
domain name that it could have registered itself, but did
not and a domain name that another party subsequently
registered and used to promote goods coming within its
generic meaning.

V. 23
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Ultimately, for Panelist Brown, the case for a finding of
reverse domain name hijacking was “not a marginal one but
a strong one.”305
At this juncture, a table offering in one glance a
summary of the three panelists’ respective views might be
helpful:
Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. [U.S.] v. Kwang pyo Kim
[Korea]
Complainant’s mark: “thefirestore.com”; Respondent’s
domain name: <firestore.com>
WIPO Case No. 2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011)
Panelist

¶ 4(a)(i)

¶ 4(a)(iii)
Addressed
for
purposes
of
Complainant
RDNH.
Respondent
has rights in
Conjunctive
has right or
subject mark;
requirement.
interest
in
confusing
No bad faith
domain name
similarity
registration.
(Recent)
bad
faith use.
Complainant
Respondent
Unnecessary to
does not have does not have decide

Kennedy,
Pr. Pan.

Hudis,
Pan.

Id.
305

Id.

¶ 4(a)(ii)

Decision

RDNH

Complaint
No
denied

Complaint
No
denied
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or
306
subject mark
interest
in
domain name
Complainant
Respondent
has rights in
has right or
subject mark;
interest
in
confusing
domain name
similarity

Brown,
Pan.
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Conjunctive
requirement.
Complaint
No bad faith
Yes
denied
registration.
No bad faith use.

In review, the panel was unanimous in its decision to
deny the complaint. A majority (Kennedy and Brown)
determined that the complainant proved that the domain
name was identical or confusingly similar to a mark in
which the complainant had rights.307 The same majority
concluded that the complainant failed to prove that the
respondent did not have a right or interest in the domain
name. With respect to the bad faith element, Panelist Hudis
wrote that it was not necessary to address it; Presiding

“I would decide this matter based upon the Complainant’s failure of
proof regarding its trade mark priority.” Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring).
307 Regarding the first element, and specifically, the situation of a domain
name that is registered before the complainant’s registration of a mark or
common law rights in the mark, the Presiding Panelist and Panelist
Brown’s approach appears to be the consensus view. WIPO reports:
“Registration of a domain name before a complainant acquires
trademark rights in a name does not prevent a finding of identity or
confusing similarity under the UDRP. The UDRP makes no specific
reference to the date on which the holder of the trademark or service
mark acquired rights.” WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26, ¶ 1.4. Of
course, precisely as the two panelists intimated, WIPO notes that “in
such circumstances it may be difficult to prove that the domain name
was registered in bad faith under the third element of the UDRP.” Id.
306
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Panelist Kennedy (who addressed it for the purpose of a
reverse domain name hijacking determination) and Panelist
Brown applied the “conjunctive requirement,” with the
former finding an absence of bad faith registration but
evidence of recent bad faith use, and the latter finding
absence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use. A
different majority (Kennedy and Hudis) declined to find
reverse domain name hijacking, from which Brown
dissented.
Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. makes for an
interesting case study of a UDRP proceeding decided by a
three-member panel. Had the proceeding been decided by a
sole panelist, and WIPO appointed any one of the three
panelists, and the individual panelists decided the matter on
the respective grounds indicated in the three-member
decision, the complaint would have been denied, though for
different reasons. If Panelist Brown were the sole panelist,
the respondent would have prevailed on its request for a
finding of reverse domain name hijacking. In all events, the
three panelists’ opinions, individually and as a group,
contribute to a sharper understanding of the requisite
elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.
C.   DISSENT ON MERITS
There are six decisions that include a dissent on the
merits of the case. In the first two, the dissenting panelist
disagreed with the majority’s decision to deny the
complaint, and would have ordered a transfer of the
disputed domain name. (The majority decision in both of
these cases is written in Korean.) In the last four, the
individual panelist dissented from the majority’s decision to
order transfer of the domain name, and would have denied
the complaint. These decisions are addressed in turn.
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A.   DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF COMPLAINT
a.   <FRANCE3.COM>
The three-member panel decision involving the
domain name <france3.com> came a year after a UDRP
decision by a sole panelist involving the same parties and
the same domain name.308 The proceeding before the threemember panel was not an appeal of the decision by the sole
panelist. The UDRP framework does not provide for
appellate review of a panel decision by another panel. Thus,
an initial question for the second panel was whether there
was a proper re-filed complaint.309

Societe Nationale de Television France3 v. Kim Segwon, WIPO Case
No. D2001-1322 (Jan. 29, 2002) (sole panelist) [in Korean].
309 WIPO provides:
A refiled case concerns the complainant submitting a
second complaint involving the same domain name(s)
and the same respondent(s) as in an earlier complaint
that had been denied. A refiled case may only be
accepted in limited circumstances. These circumstances
include when the complainant establishes in the
complaint that relevant new actions have occurred since
the original decision, or that a breach of natural justice
or of due process has occurred, or that there was other
serious misconduct in the original case (such as perjured
evidence). A refiled complaint would usually also be
accepted if it includes newly presented evidence that
was reasonably unavailable to the complainant during
the original case.
WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26, ¶ 4.4 (“Under what circumstances can
a refiled case be accepted?”).
308
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To retrace, the Korean respondent registered the
domain name on March 28, 2001.310 The domain name
initially resolved to a website with pornographic content.
The pictures were later removed, and replaced with a
message that read, “sex solution. . . . We start the optimal
website for you.”311 The complainant, a French television
broadcasting company that registered and used the mark
“FRANCE3” for its business, brought a UDRP complaint in
November 2001.
The sole panelist denied the complaint, reasoning that
the complainant failed to satisfy the second and third
elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.312 Regarding the
respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the domain name,
the panel noted that the respondent was preparing to use the
domain name for the service of “providing adult
information” (sung-in-jung-boh-jeh-gong-ub), and specifically
referred to paragraph 4(c)(i).313 With respect to the bad faith
element, the panel stated that there was inadequate evidence
to show that the respondent registered the domain name to
sell it to the complainant, and indeed, referred to the
respondent’s plans to use it for the adult-oriented services.
Moreover, the panel noted that although the complainant’s
mark might be well-known in France and other parts of
Europe, it was not so in Korea; indeed, the complainant did

Societe Nationale de Television France3 v. [Segwon Kim], WIPO Case
No. D2002-1181 (May 9, 2003) (three-member panel) [in Korean].
311 Societe Nationale de Television France3, WIPO Case No. D2001-1322. The
phrase “sex solution” was in English; the rest is a translation from
Korean text.
312 Id.
313 Id.
310
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not register the mark in Korea. Finally, given the differences
in the parties’ businesses, the panel added, there could not
be confusion by Internet users.314
Eleven months after the decision of the sole panelist,
the complainant commenced another UDRP proceeding.315
The complainant asserted that there was new evidence to
show that after the previous panel decision, the respondent
entered into a contract with a third party to sell the domain
name for US$100,000, thus proving bad faith.316 In a twist,
the respondent countered that it was the complainant who
suggested to the third party that the third party contact the
respondent to purchase the domain name.317 For the second
proceeding, WIPO appointed three panelists: Nathalie
Dreyfus, of France; Sang Jo Jung, of Korea (as the presiding
panelist); and Dr. Jisuk Woo, of Korea. (The decision does
not state which party elected to have the proceeding decided
by a three-member panel.) Initially, the panel cited prior
panel decisions to set forth the limited grounds for bringing
a re-filed complaint.318 Ultimately, the panel appeared to
accept the respondent’s contention that the complainant in
effect arranged to have a third party contact the respondent
to purchase the domain name from the respondent. Under

Id.
Societe Nationale de Television France3, WIPO Case No. D2002-1181.
316 Id.
317 Id. The decision does not mention whether the complainant sought to
contest the respondent’s charge.
318 Id. (citing Grove Broad. Co. v. Telesystems Commc’ns Ltd., WIPO
Case No. D2000-0703 (Nov. 10, 2000); Creo Prods. Inc. v. Website In Dev.,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1490 (Jan. 19, 2001); Furrytails Ltd. v. Andrew
Mitchell, WIPO Case No. D2001-0857 (Sept. 6, 2001)).
314
315
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these circumstances, the panel observed, the complainant
should not be permitted to bring a re-filed complaint.319 The
panel explicitly referred to the principle of “estoppel”
(parenthetically, in English).320 The panel therefore denied
the complaint.
The decision also noted that after the sole panelist’s
previous resolution of the dispute, the complainant sought
to retrieve the domain name by bringing an action against
the respondent in a French court in Nantes321 (where it
prevailed), and also in the Seoul District Court322 (where it
did not). The panel noted that even if it were to accept the refiled complaint and order a transfer of the domain name, the
order would be unnecessary or impossible to implement,
given the Korean court’s disposition of the dispute.323
Although there is no separate opinion, the text of the
panel’s decision in Korean devotes a section entitled
“opposing opinion” (반대의견 or bahn-deh-eui-gyun), which
notes a dissenting view.324 This portion of the decision
describes Panelist Nathalie Dreyfus’ statement that: the refiled complaint should be allowed in light of the new
evidence of the respondent’s contract to sell the domain
name; the domain name should be transferred to the
complainant because the requisite elements are satisfied; the

319

Id.

Id.
Id. (citing “Ordonnance de Refere Rendue Le 17 Mai 2001, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Nanterre (N°R.G.: 01/01497)”).
322 Id. (citing Seoul D. Ct., jah 2001 kah-hahb 1625 (Sept. 26, 2001)).
323 Id. In this discussion, the panel referred to and paraphrased
paragraph 17 of the UDRP Rules. Id. n.8.
324 Id.
320
321
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domain name was used for a pornographic website; and
there was bad faith in selling the domain name to a third
party.325
The <france3.com> affair, which involved two UDRP
proceedings, conflicting decisions from courts in two
different countries, and international intrigue, is not a
typical dispute over a domain name. The two panel
decisions invite further discussion on several issues
stemming from the UDRP process. First, there are many
examples of disputes involving domain names that resort to
sexually graphic and explicit websites. UDRP decisions have
found that using a domain name for a site with
pornographic content may not always be a right or
legitimate interest in respect of the domain name,326 and also
that such use is evidence of bad faith.327 Here, the domain
name initially resolved to a site with pornographic pictures,
which were removed and replaced with a message referring
to a website relating to “sex solution.” Even if, arguably, a
service that provides “adult information” relating to “sex
solution” is a bona fide offering of services under paragraph
4(c)(i), there is a question as to the distinction between such
a service and pornographic material.
The burden is on the complainant to prove the
presence of all three elements. Although this burden is eased
somewhat relating to the respondent’s right or interest in the

Id.
E.g., V&V Supremo Foods, Inc. v. pxlchk1@gmail.com, WIPO Case
No. D2006-1373 (Jan. 22, 2007).
327 E.g., id.; Coral Trademarks, Ltd. v. Eastern Net, Inc., WIPO Case No.
D2000-1295 (Dec. 26, 2000); America Online, Inc. v. Viper, WIPO Case
No. D2000-1198 (Nov. 28, 2000).
325
326

2016

THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS

525

domain name, proving the respondent’s bad faith in many
cases poses challenges. As noted above, the respondent’s
knowledge of the complainant’s mark at the time of the
domain name registration may be inferred, especially if the
mark is well-known. The sole panelist in the <france3.com>
proceeding was not convinced of the “FRANCE3” mark’s
fame in Korea and appeared to accept the respondent’s
argument that the domain name merely incorporated a
generic or geographic term. The situation is problematic for
holders of trademarks that do not have instant, worldwide
recognition. The complainant is left to pose the question of
the likelihood that an individual in Korea who desires to
register a domain name for a pornographic site would
choose “france3”328 (over “france1” or “france2,” for
example) or the “france-” prefix (over “japan-,” “germany-,”
or “switzerland-”), without having the complainant and its
mark in mind. Perhaps to make a stronger case for bad faith
– and specifically to establish the respondent’s knowledge of
the complainant and its mark, as well as the respondent’s
intent in choosing the domain name – the complainant
would have benefitted from the judicial process seen in U.S.
civil litigation.329 In contrast, the UDRP is a streamlined
procedure to address cybersquatting, with no discovery, in-

Is there some significance to the number “3” for such a site?
See, for example, Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F.
Supp. 198, 204 (D. Md. 1988), where the court, citing to various portions
of the record, rejected the defendant chief executive officer’s testimony
that his selection of “McSleep Inn” was not “an imitation of McDonald’s
or that McDonald’s occurred to him at the time that he selected the name
McSleep.”
328
329
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person hearings, or cross-examination, and the three
requisite elements of paragraph 4(a) govern.
Many domain name disputes involve parties from
different countries. The panelists appointed to decide the
disputes also have nationality. They have two options in
their decision making, which is of an all-or-nothing
character: deny the complaint or order transfer of the
domain name to the complainant. The instances where a
panelist decides in favor of the party with the same
nationality, whatever the facts of the case or the merit in the
argument, will raise a human suspicion from the nonprevailing party of national favoritism. The arbitral rules
seek to avoid this situation by appointing a sole arbitrator or
the chair of a panel (in those cases with a tribunal of three
panelists) from a third, neutral country.330 There are
examples of this practice in WIPO’s appointment of UDRP
panelists as well,331 but the expedited schedule of an
administrative proceeding332 poses challenges, in that
qualifying panelists, especially those with the necessary
language skills, may not be available.
With respect to the three-member panel decision in
<france3.com>, in denying the complaint, the majority
indicated that given the Korean court’s decision against the

See supra text accompanying note 77.
See infra text accompanying notes 376-77 & note 377.
332 The UDRP Rules provide that for a proceeding with a sole panelist,
the provider is to appoint a panelist within five days after receipt of the
respondent’s response, or the date that the response is due. UDRP Rules,
supra note 15, ¶ 6(b). Although the time frame for appointing panelists
for a proceeding with a three-member panel is more relaxed, it is
nevertheless an expedited schedule. Id.
330
331
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complainant in its request for a transfer of the domain name,
it would be pointless for the panel to decide the dispute
under the Policy. The fact, as well as the content, of the
dissent was indicated by the majority of the panel. The
description of the dissenting view provided above is a
summary of an English translation of a portion of the
decision in Korean, which presumably is a translation of
what the French dissenting panelist relayed in English to the
two Korean panelists comprising the majority. This is a
reality of the international dispute resolution tribunal, and
there is always the possibility of some loss of meaning in
translation. The dissenting view, as reported by the majority,
does not mention the matter of the complainant’s purported
involvement in the respondent’s contract for the sale of the
domain name nor the Seoul District Court’s decision, two
points on which the majority relied to reject the re-filed
complaint. The lack of a separate opinion may also
contribute to the view that the decision was unanimously
reached.333

WIPO’s notation of the case does not indicate a dissent. See Search
WIPO Cases and WIPO Panel Decisions, supra note 26 (result for D20021181). An epilogue: The respondent in the <france3.com> proceedings is
no longer the named registrant of the domain name, nor is the domain
name used for a pornographic or adult site. Currently, Internet users
who resort to <france3.com> are re-directed to <france3.fr>, which
displays a website in French text devoted to television broadcasting. The
<france3.com> domain name is registered to “France Televisions,” based
in Paris. See Whois france3.com, WHOIS,
http://www.whois.com/whois/france3.com.
333

528

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

b.   <SAMCLUB.COM>
The dispute over the domain name <samclub.com>
was also the subject of two separate proceedings involving
the same parties, the first decided by a sole panelist,334 and
then after a re-filed complaint, by a three-member panel.335
There, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the U.S.-based retailer that had
rights in the mark “SAM’S CLUB”, challenged the Korean
party’s registration and use of the domain name
<samclub.com>. The sole panelist denied the complaint.336
Eight months later, the complainant commenced another
UDRP proceeding against the same respondent over the
same domain name, and requested a three-member panel to
decide the dispute. The panel unanimously agreed that the
complaint presented a new dispute and that the tribunal had
the authority to decide it. The panel denied the complaint by
a majority vote.337 I was the dissenting panelist, and in an
exercise of discretion, decline to offer an analysis of the
pertinent issues in the decision. The <samclub.com>
proceeding is included here for the sake of a complete
database of the subject decisions. The reasons for my
disagreement with the majority’s decision are set out in full
in the dissenting opinion.338 Interested readers are invited to
review the decision by the sole panelist, the majority

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2005-0492 (June
28, 2005) (sole panelist) [in Korean].
335 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2006-0226 (June
20, 2006) (three-member panel) [in Korean].
336 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0492.
337 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0226.
338 Id. (Lee, Pan., dissenting).
334
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decision, and the dissenting opinion (or their translations),
and reach their own conclusions about the proceedings in
the context of this study.339
i.  

DISSENT FROM TRANSFER
a.   <STX.COM>

The complainant in STX LLC v. Yu nae ho,340 a leading
manufacturer and distributor of sporting equipment and
apparel, especially lacrosse and hockey equipment, used the
mark “STX” for its products. STX products were sold in a
number of countries, including Korea. On April 18, 2006,
two weeks before the complaint was filed, STX LLC sent a
cease and desist letter to the then registrant of the domain
name <stx.com>, which resolved to a site that included links
to the complainant’s competitors and “meta-tags such as
‘STX lacrosse’ and ‘STX field hockey[].’”341 On April 19, the
respondent, who had made a down payment of ₩9,000,000
(approximately US$9,475, under the exchange rate at that
time) five days prior, paid the rest of the sales price and took
“assignment” of the domain name.342 On April 20, by when
<whois.com> records indicated the change in the registrant,
the complainant sent an email to the respondent attaching

The domain name is still registered to the respondent; the domain
name resolves to an active website.
340 WIPO Case No. D2006-0567 (Aug. 14, 2006).
341 Id.
342 Id. This is the resulting figure using the currency converter for April
13, 2006. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currencyconverter (last visited May 24, 2016).
339
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the complainant’s cease and desist letter to the previous
registrant; the respondent did not respond. On May 4, the
complainant commenced the UDRP proceeding. “Sometime
later (the exact date is unknown),” the respondent replaced
the content of the website previously described with an
“under construction message.”343
The panel unanimously decided that the domain
name <stx.com> was confusingly similar to the “STX” mark
in which the complainant had rights.344 The panel was also
unanimous in deciding that the respondent did not have a
right or legitimate interest in respect of the domain name.345
The panel’s treatment of the bad faith element was more
complex and divided. In summary, the majority of the panel
– Presiding Panelist Lawrence K. Nodine and Panelist Sally
M. Abel – determined that the respondent registered and
used the domain name in bad faith “primarily because he
did not discontinue his predecessor’s bad faith” until after
the complaint was filed.346
Elaborating, the majority stated that the active
website was bad faith use in that the contents included
advertisements for lacrosse and hockey products, links to the
complainant’s competitors, and meta-tags that targeted the
complainant. This was evidence that the respondent

STX LLC, WIPO Case No. D2006-0567.
Id. Indeed, the respondent conceded the point.
345 Id. The panel stated that the respondent’s purported intention to use
the <stx.com> domain name “for a website for Social Training for
eXtreme People” was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
“demonstrable preparations to use . . . the domain name in connection
with a bona fide offering of goods or services,” under UDRP ¶ 4(c)(i). Id.
346 Id.
343
344
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attempted to attract Internet users to the website by creating
a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark,
under paragraph 4(b)(iv).347 The majority of the panel also
found bad faith registration of the domain name, for
purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii). Initially, the majority
explained that bad faith acquisition substitutes for bad faith
registration. Here, bad faith was present in that, absent
contrary evidence, the respondent was presumed to have
knowledge of the offending contents of the website at the
time he acquired the domain name.348
The majority noted, in two separate footnotes, that the
third panelist “does not join.”349 The dissenting opinion
reads in full: “I respectfully dissent. In my view, the
Complainant has failed to sustain its burden of proving that
the Respondent registered (or acquired) and has used the
disputed domain name in bad faith. I would therefore deny
the Complaint.”350 We cannot know of the deliberations
among the panel members in STX LLC regarding the bad
faith element. The three panelists may well have vetted all
aspects of the issue in full, with each panelist expounding
her or his reasons; the majority may have re-cast its
formulation of bad faith acquisition and bad faith use, in

Id.
Id.
349 “Panelist David Sorkin does not join in the finding of bad faith
registration.” Id. n.1. “Panelist David Sorkin does not join in this portion
of the decision and would instead find that Complainant has not
satisfied its burden to prove that Respondent Yu registered or acquired
the disputed domain name in bad faith.” Id. n.2. Of note, the majority’s
description refers only to registration or acquisition, not use.
350 Id. (Sorkin, Pan., dissenting).
347
348
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light of the dissenter’s concerns. This is known only to the
panelists.
As alluded to above, the bad faith element under
paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy has been the subject of much
discussion by panelists and commentators.351 The STX LLC
decision contributes further. Note in the majority’s
exposition, the references to the respondent’s responsibility,
inferences, presumptions, coded and imputed knowledge,
and rules:
We . . . hold Respondent Yu responsible
for the contents of the webpage as of the filing
date of the UDRP Complaint. This rule is
recognized where ownership does not change,
i.e. a registrant may not escape bad faith
inferences by deleting offending content from a
webpage after an action is filed. . . .
The rule should be no different merely
because the Respondent acquired ownership
shortly before, in this case two weeks prior to,
the filing of the UDRP action. The status of the
webpage on the date the UDRP action is filed
controls the proceedings. . . . If he were acting
in good faith, Respondent Yu should have
taken down the offending webpage promptly
after receiving the April 20 cease and desist email. . . .
. . . The inferences that may be drawn
from the content of the webpage should not

351

See supra text accompanying notes 150-78 & note 156.
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change where the registrant only recently
acquired ownership of the page.
. . . It is immaterial that the Respondent
subsequently deleted offending content from
the [webpage].
....
. . . [T]he assignee of the disputed
domain name in all likelihood had knowledge of
the content of the webpage displayed on the
acquired domain name at the time of
acquisition. . . . Respondent Yu may fairly be
presumed, therefore, to have had knowledge of,
not only the hockey and lacrosse product
emphasis and links that the appeared on the
<stx.com> webpage, but also of the meta-tags
that reveal use of the trademark STX (“stx
lacrosse” and “stx field hockey”) in the metatags. We find that it is more likely than not that
these meta-tags were coded with knowledge of
the Complainant’s trademark rights with
respect to lacrosse and hockey products for the
express purpose of attracting internet users
looking for the Complainant’s STX products. . .
.
. . . [A]ny other rule would enable an
accused cyber-pirate to avoid the UDRP by
quick transfers. If it is fair to infer that the
creator of the meta-tags was aware of the
Complainant’s rights, then we must be
permitted to apply the same inference to the
conduct of an assignee who fails to take down
the offending site after he acquires control of it
and continues to publish the webpage after
receiving notice of the Complainant’s rights. A

533
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majority of the Panel would charge the
Respondent with knowledge of the meta-tags that
appear on the web-page he continued to
broadcast and further charge him with awareness
that these meta-tags revealed trademark usage
of STX.
. . . [T]he rule should be that one who
acquires a webpage that has been used in bad
faith assumes responsibility for the contents of
that page if he continues to publish it after
receiving notice of the Complainant’s rights. . .
.352
It is not clear from what, if any, of the above the
dissenter was dissenting. To be sure, the dissent of the
thirty-eight words might have defenders, especially from
those in arbitration circles.353 Nevertheless, the UDRP

STX LLC, WIPO Case No. D2006-0567 (emphasis added).
Given the conflicting views on the utility of a dissent in arbitration
cases, some commentators urge that a dissenting opinion, if it must be
filed at all, should be “short, polite and restrained.” REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 250, at 392. In this regard, in my own travels, one well-known
arbitrator, who indicated to me his opposition to dissenting opinions in
arbitration matters, advised that if an arbitrator disagrees with the
majority on the ultimate outcome of the award, “[h]e has two options.
Refuse to sign the award, or just write, ‘I respectfully dissent.’” Another
commentator, however, has cautioned against a dissent that is too brief
to be helpful. “A perfunctory dissent will serve neither the institution of
arbitration nor any of the parties. A responsibly formulated dissent is
also required to encourage the majority to proper reconsideration of its
award in the light of the dissent.” Hans Smit, Dissenting Opinions in
Arbitration, 15 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 37, 41 (2004).
352
353
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process benefits more when panel decisions are seen as a
form of international common law (where persuasive
precedents emerge after panel percolation), rather than as
international commercial arbitration (which arguably
emphasizes a decision for the dispute only).354 In all events,
the legal commentary is taking note of dissenting opinions,
and notable dissenters, in UDRP decisions.355
b.   <ISCRUB.COM>
The complainant in Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. []
Vertical Axis, Inc., was a U.S. company engaged “in the
process of document creation, formatting, re-purposing,
comparing, and the supply of metadata management

Redfern and Hunter have noted that “the very purpose of an
arbitration . . . is to arrive at a determinative decision. . . . It is that
decision which matters; and it matters not as a guide to the opinions of a
particular arbitrator, or as an indication of the future development of the
law, but because it resolves the particular dispute that divides the
parties, in the manner chosen by the parties, even if one of the arbitrators
believes that decision to be wrong.” REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 250,
at 392. Nevertheless, the notion of (non-binding) precedent in arbitration
is receiving more attention. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite:
How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2012).
355 For example, Panelist M. Scott Donahey’s dissent in Guru Denim Inc. v.
Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim Abu-Harb, WIPO Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27,
2013), was critically reviewed by a Harvard Law Review piece. Cyberlaw,
supra note 34, at 2132-33. “Guru Denim is not a novel dissent for
Donahey: for the past half-decade, he has consistently advocated for a
unitary understanding of bad faith in the face of widespread acceptance
of the conjunctive view.” Id. at 2133 (citing A. Nattermann v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2010-0800 (Aug. 31, 2010) (Donahey, Pan.,
dissenting)).
354
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software applications for the legal profession.”356 One of the
complainant’s products, named Iscrub, was designed to
remove metadata from documents.357 The complainant
registered the “ISCRUB” mark with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office on July 26, 2005, over three years after the
respondent, Vertical Axis, Inc., had registered the domain
name <iscrub.com>, on November 8, 2001. The respondent
stated in its response that the complainant did not have
enforceable trademark rights under the UDRP “because its
mark does not predate the domain name and the alleged
date of first use of the mark is four months after the domain
name was registered.”358 The respondent also requested a
finding of reverse domain name hijacking. Five days after
the response was filed, the complainant submitted a
supplemental filing that contained new evidence that the
first commercial use of the complainant’s “ISCRUB” mark
occurred before the registration of disputed domain name.
About four weeks later, WIPO appointed the panel, which
issued a procedural order stating that the panel would
consider the complainant’s supplemental filing, and
allowing the respondent to file a reply. The respondent did
so.359

WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007). For citation purposes, the
identity shield service as a named respondent party is omitted.
357 “Metadata is electronic text that has been removed from documents
and other electronic records, but which has been left behind in the
process of amending documents so that, unless removed by Iscrub or
another process, it may still be detected.” Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
356
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Presiding Panelist, the Honorable Neil Anthony
Brown QC,360 and Panelists David E. Sorkin and David H.
Tatham comprised the three-member panel. Before turning
to the merits, the panel discussed the matter of supplemental
filings. Under the UDRP Rules,361 only the panel, in its
discretion, may request further submissions, and parties
may not do so without leave of the panel.362 A majority of
the panel decided in the exercise of its discretion to consider
supplemental filings:
In this case, the Complainant’s Supplemental
Filing was timely filed, as it was lodged only 7
days after the Response and, as the
Complainant says, it has not delayed the
proceedings as it was filed simultaneously
with its nomination of Panelists. Therefore, on
the strength of this, and in the light of the
above Decisions,[363] which give to a panel the

The presentation of the presiding panelist’s title and name appears
this way, and differs from that seen in Witmer Pub. Safety Grp. Inc. v.
Kwang pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011). Panelist
Brown’s separate opinion therein is discussed supra text accompanying
notes 302-05.
361 “Further Statements[.] In addition to the complaint and the response,
the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or
documents from either of the Parties.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 12.
362 Within the 58 decisions, there are examples of the panel exercising its
discretion and reaching different results. Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. []
Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014) (admitting
supplemental filing); Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd.,
WIPO Case No. D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008) (declining to admit
supplemental filing).
363 The majority previously cited and quoted from a number of WIPOadministered decisions, including principally, Deutsche Börse AG v.
360
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flexibility to admit new evidence that was not
previously available, a majority of the Panel in
this case is prepared to take the Complainant’s
Supplemental Filing into account.364
Ultimately, the majority concluded that the evidence
submitted by the complainant in its supplemental filing was
“pivotal” to the resolution of the case, and that the
respondent availed itself of the opportunity to reply, “so no
injustice can be done to the Respondent.”365 “Indeed,” the
majority noted, “the Panel cannot but be assisted by now
having before it all of the material that each side wishes to
submit.”366 Turning to the merits, the majority concluded
that the three elements of paragraph 4(a) were satisfied.
With respect to the bad faith element, the majority found
that the respondent’s activities were covered under three of
the examples provided in paragraph 4(b): (i), (ii), and (iv).367
Panelist Sorkin dissented. He stated that while he
“agree[d] with many of the majority’s findings,” the
complainant did not meet its burden of proof on bad faith
registration, even if the complainant’s supplemental filing
was considered.368 The panelist did not further elaborate on

Ramon Campos Munoz, WIPO Case No. D2005-0346 (May 23, 2005) (citing
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Kerpacev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571
(June 17, 2001)).
364 Esquire Innovations, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id. (Sorkin, Pan., dissenting).
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his views regarding the majority’s disposition of the bad
faith element. “More importantly,” he wrote, “I believe that
the Panel should not consider the parties’ supplemental
filings . . . .”369 The dissent urged that the panel’s discretion
provided for in the UDRP Rules “ought not be exercised
lightly. As the majority acknowledges, additional
submissions should be considered only in exceptional
circumstances . . . .”370 To the dissent, the case did not
present the requisite circumstances to warrant an exception
to the general rule.
Panelist Sorkin also stated that “based upon the
remaining information before the Panel, I would find that
the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an
abuse of this administrative proceeding.”371 He further
wrote:
The Complaint alleges that Respondent
registered the disputed domain name in bad
faith in 2001, intending to benefit from a
trademark that did not even exist until
Complainant adopted and began using it in
2002. In my view, the filing of such an
obviously frivolous claim represents an abuse
of the UDRP process and warrants a finding
that the complaint was brought in bad faith, in
an attempt at reverse domain name hijacking. .
. .[372]

Id.
Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. (citing Datalyst LLC v. Estes, NAF Case No. FA954109 (May 9,
2007); Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006369
370
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The fact that Complainant later
discovered that it had been mistaken about the
age of its claimed common-law trademark
rights does not alter this conclusion. Had
Complainant not elected to abuse the UDRP
process by filing a complaint that it knew or
should have known to be frivolous, it would
later have been in a position to file a
nonfrivolous complaint (and indeed, were we
to dismiss the present matter, Complainant
would remain free to initiate a second UDRP
proceeding or pursue a trademark claim in
court).373
The Esquire Innovations, Inc. proceeding offers a vivid
example of how individual panelists may take profoundly
different positions on precisely the same issue, which may in
turn effect different outcomes for the parties. Both the
majority and the dissent quoted paragraph 12 of the UDRP
Rules to emphasize the panel’s discretion in allowing
additional party submissions. Discretion was in the eye of
the beholder. In addition, both referred to the same
examples of “exceptional circumstances” that allow for

0905 (Oct. 10, 2006); Mess Enters. v. Scott Enters., WIPO Case No. D20040964 (Jan. 25, 2005); carsales.com.au Ltd. v. Flanders, WIPO Case No.
D2004-0047 (Apr. 8, 2004); NetDeposit, Inc. v. NetDeposit.com, WIPO
Case No. D2003-0365 (July 22, 2003)).
373 Id.
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consideration of supplemental filings.374 Operating under
the same standards, the majority and the dissent reached
different results. Based on the respective determinations
regarding the supplemental filings, the majority continued
to reach a decision ordering the transfer of the domain name,
while the dissent would have issued a finding of reverse
domain name hijacking. Perhaps Esquire Innovations, Inc.
might give pause to UDRP parties to consider requesting
three-member panels toward a collective decision making
process, given that much of the panelist’s work is a matter of
individual discretion.
As a prelude to the last two dissenting opinions, in
the international arbitration setting, when the parties are
nationals of two different countries, the three-member
tribunal is sometimes comprised of: one arbitrator each from
the country of the respective parties (often party-nominated
arbitrators); and the chair or presiding arbitrator from a
third, neutral country.375 Fifty-six of the 58 UDRP decisions

Id. (majority decision) (quoting Deutsche Börse AG v. Ramon Campos
Munoz, WIPO Case No. D2005-0346 (May 23, 2005) (“As a rule,
additional evidence or submissions should only be admitted in
exceptional circumstances, such as when additional submissions are
necessary to reply to the finding of newly discovered evidence not
reasonably available to the submitting party at the time of its initial
submission or to rebut arguments by the respondent that the
complainant could not reasonably have anticipated.”)); id. (Sorkin, Pan.,
dissenting) (paraphrasing quotation).
375 One commentator explains thus:
In a dispute between say an Indonesian party and an
Australian party there may well be an apprehension of
unfairness if the dispute is litigated before an Indonesian
or Australian court. The fact that the adjudicator
possesses the nationality of one of the parties may well
374
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herein involve a dispute between a Korean and a nonKorean party.376 Nine of these fifty-six see a panel with a
Korean panelist, a non-Korean panelist with the same
nationality as the non-Korean party in the dispute, and the
presiding panelist of a third country.377 Seven of these nine

be regarded as unfair or at least undesirable. It is here
that arbitration has the distinct advantage. Usually an
international arbitrator will not hold the nationality of
either of the disputant parties. This is the common case
if there is one arbitrator. In the case of a tribunal of three
arbitrators, the chairman will be neutral though each of
the party-appointed arbitrators may well bear the
nationality of the appointing party.
Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 267, 280 (1996).
376 Of the said fifty-six decisions, all but three involve a non-Korean
complainant against a Korean respondent. The three with the Korean
complainant and a non-Korean respondent are: Samsung Networks Co. v.
SuperVirtualOffice Corp., WIPO Case No. DVE2010-0001 (May 10, 2010);
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630 (Feb.
16, 2010); and Topfield Co. v. Jai Kemp & Dig. Prods. Grp. Pty Ltd., WIPO
Case No. DAU2008-0002 (Apr. 21, 2008). Two other decisions involve a
Korean complainant versus a respondent whose listed address is in the
U.S., but according to the decisions, the respondent had significant ties to
Korea. Orion Corp. v. Jang, Dong, WIPO Case No. D2012-2184 (Feb. 7,
2013) (stating that respondent “spent most of its life in the Republic of
Korea”); NHN Corp. v. NHN Corp., WIPO Case No. D2003-0939 (Feb.
27, 2004) (stating that president of respondent was “of Korean origin,
[and] understand[s] the Korean language”).
377 For these nine decisions, the nationality of the three panelists is
indicated in the following list. Korea appears first if the complainant was
a Korean party, and last if it was the respondent; the nationality of the
presiding panelist is indicated in the middle. JJGC Industria E Comercio
de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1838
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resulted in unanimous panel decisions;378 dissents were filed
in the other two.
In both of the decisions with a dissenting opinion, the
complainant was Amazon.com, the U.S. company that
operates “an Internet website <amazon.com> that permits
persons around the world to purchase books and other
merchandise including motor vehicles on-line,”379 and is
“one of the most famous trading names on the internet and

(Dec. 20, 2013) (Brazil-U.S.-Korea); UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope
Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012)
(Australia & Great Britain-Netherlands-Korea); United Airlines, Inc. v.
United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO Case No. D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002)
(U.S.-India-Korea); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case No.
D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002) (U.S.-Great Britain-Korea); VoiceStream
Wireless Corp. v. Hanjin Ko, WIPO Case No. D2001-1411 (AustraliaGreat Britain-Korea); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case
No. D2001-1275 (Dec. 20, 2001) (U.S.-New Zealand-Korea); Amazon.com,
Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 20, 2001) (U.S.New Zealand-Korea); SEMATECH, Inc. v. Lee Hyunggyu, WIPO Case
No. D2001-0870 (Nov. 26, 2001) (U.S.-Australia-Korea); SMS Demag AG
v. Seung Gon, Kim, WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (Jan. 19, 2001)
(Germany-New Zealand-Korea).
In a tenth case, Banco Itau S.A. v. Webmedia, the complainant was
a national of Brazil; the respondent, a national of Korea. The panelists
were from Brazil, Korea, and Great Britain. The presiding panelist was
Korean. WIPO Case No. D2008-0531 (July 18, 2008).
378 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No.
D2013-1838 (complaint denied); UTV Limited, WIPO Case No. D20112293 (complaint denied); United Airlines, Inc., WIPO Case No. D20020835 (transfer); VoiceStream Wireless Corp., WIPO Case No. D2001-1411
(transfer); Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D2001-1275 (transfer);
SEMATECH, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0870 (transfer); SMS Demag AG,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (transfer).
379 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276.
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has expanded its range of products to include . . . video
tapes and DVDs.”380 The complainant had registrations of
the “AMAZON.COM” mark in seventy countries, including
Korea.381
c.   <AMAZONCAR.COM>; <AMAZONECAR.COM>
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho,382 we return to
the decision that opened this article. Amazon.com objected
to the Korean respondent’s registration of the domain names
<amazoncar.com> (which was used for “a Korean language
website that offers to rent or lease Hyundai & Kia
automobiles”) and <amazonecar.com> (which did not
resolve to a website).383 The respondent did not file a
response. The panel – comprised of M. Scott Donahey (U.S.),
the Honorable Sir Ian Barker QC (New Zealand) as the
presiding panelist, and Boh Young Hwang (Korea) –
unanimously determined that the domain names were
confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark and that the
respondent had no right or legitimate interest in the domain
name.384 Regarding the bad faith element, “in the view of the
majority of the Panel[,]
it strains belief that the Respondent did not
know of the Complainant’s mark and

Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330.
Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. Here, the panel also noted
that “[s]tudies by Internet monitors have identified the <amazon.com>
as one of the most frequently visited sites on the Internet.” Id.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Id.
380
381
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reputation at the time of registration. The
inference that there has been a crude attempt
by the Respondent to capitalize on the
Complainant’s reputation as a worldwide
vendor on the Internet is inescapable. It is thus
easy to infer that the Respondent in bad faith is
attempting to divert to his website Internet
users who may think the website has some
connection with the Complainant.385
Panelist Hwang386 dissented. Although she agreed
with the majority on the first two elements of paragraph
4(a), she stated that the complainant failed to prove that the
domain names were registered and used in bad faith, and
thus would have denied the complaint.387 The crux of the
dissenting view appears to be that even though the
complainant’s trademark was “famous worldwide,”
especially for its business of Internet book sales, there was
no evidence that the mark was well-known for car-related
products or services.388 Panelist Hwang noted that the
respondent’s website for <amazoncar.com> was used only
for a car-rental service and presented only “in the local
language of the country which the Respondent is targeting

Id.
Until her untimely passing in 2009, Panelist Hwang was the most
prolific Korean author of WIPO-administered UDRP decisions.
387 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Hwang, Pan., dissenting).
388 Id. Panelist Hwang also noted the lack of evidence to show the
complainant’s trademark or service rights relating to such car products
or car rental services, especially in Korea. Id.
385
386
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for its business purposes.”389 In contrast to the majority’s
conclusion on the respondent’s intent in selecting the
domain name, the dissent expressed a fundamentally
different view: “Except for the Complainant’s use of the
word ‘amazoncar’, the reiteration of its domain name and its
trade name, nowhere in the Complaint is any indication that
the Respondent registered or is using the domain names and
the word ‘amazon’ for the purpose of capitalizing on the
Complainant’s reputation.”390

Id. She also observed that the complainant’s website for its car-dealing
business was maintained under another domain name,
<carsdirect.com>, “although it still represents <amazon.com> as its
trademark.” Id.
390 Id. Of interest here is the decision in another proceeding in which
Amazon.com was the complainant, but against a different named
respondent. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No.
D2001-1275 (Dec. 20, 2001). The decision in Amazoninsu Co. was issued
on the same date as that in Sung Hee Cho, and by the same panel that
decided Sung Hee Cho – Panelist Donahey, Presiding Panelist Barker, and
Panelist Hwang. Id.; Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. In
Amazoninsu Co., the respondent registered the domain name
<amazon119.com>, and used it “for a Korean language website that
offers automobile insurance.” Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D20011275. There, the panel unanimously determined that the complainant
successfully proved the requisite elements of paragraph 4(a) of the
Policy, and ordered the transfer of the domain name. Id. The panel’s
language in Amazoninsu.com (<amazon119.com>) describing the
complainant and in disposing of each of the three elements is virtually
identical to the corresponding text seen in Sung Hee Cho
(<amazoncar.com>). Amazoninsu.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276; Sung
Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. In Sung Hee Cho, regarding the bad
faith element, the majority stated:
it strains belief that the Respondent did not know of the
Complainant’s mark and reputation at the time of
389
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In urging that the complainant should be required to
present “more concrete evidence of bad faith,” Hwang
referred to the geographic and generic nature of the domain
name: “The name ‘Amazon’ is the name of the famous river
which runs through the South American Continent and it is
within the general knowledge of the public”; and “[t]he term
‘car’ refers to a general commodity used in our everyday life
which is the subject of trade in various transactions
worldwide.”391 This point was also made by the dissenter in
the next decision.
d.   <AMAZONPIC.COM>
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic,392 the Korean
respondent registered the domain name <amazonpic.com>,
which resolved to a website used for the respondent’s
business of selling DVDs. The panel was comprised of David
Plant (U.S.), Presiding Panelist Tony Willoughby (Great
Britain), and Dr. Jisuk Woo (Korea). Regarding the first

registration. The inference that there has been a crude
attempt by the Respondent to capitalize on the
Complainant’s reputation as a worldwide vendor on the
Internet is inescapable. It is thus easy to infer that the
Respondent in bad faith is attempting to divert to his website
Internet users who may think the website has some connection
with the Complainant.
Id. (emphasis added). In Amazoninsu.com, the italicized text in the
passage above was omitted. Amazoninsu.com, WIPO Case No. D20011275. There was no dissent from Panelist Hwang in the
<amazon119.com> decision. Id.
391 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Hwang, Pan., dissenting).
392 WIPO Case No. D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002).
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element of identical or confusing similarity, the panel, rather
than resorting to a simple, objective comparison of the mark
and the domain name,393 instead adopted the formula
advanced by the complainant, namely, that “confusing
similarity turns on use, similarity of the marks and terms in
question, similarity of products and services, similarity of
users and similarity of channels of distribution.”394 The
majority concluded that all of these factors were present, but
noted that confusing similarity would be in question and the
complainant’s case would fail if few Korean Internet users
had knowledge of the complainant.395 That was not the case
here, per the majority, because “Amazon.com is so famous
that there must be a risk that a not insubstantial number of
internet users in Korea will believe as a result of the
similarities between the Complainant’s trade mark and the
Domain Name that the businesses associated with each are
in some way related.”396
Regarding the respondent’s right or legitimate
interest in the domain name, the majority stated that the
complainant not only made its prima facie case, but also
countered anticipated arguments that the respondent might
raise to demonstrate a right or legitimate interest under
paragraph 4(b) of the Policy. The burden shifting to the
respondent, the majority noted that the respondent did “not
seek to answer any of the Complainant’s allegations. Indeed,
and most significantly of all, it does not deny the allegation

See supra text accompanying note 100.
Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330.
395 Id.
396 Id.
393
394
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that when it registered the Domain Name it had the
Complainant’s name and trade mark in mind.”397 Still under
the heading of the respondent’s right or interest in the
domain name, the majority opined that when the respondent
registered the domain name, it was “well aware of the fame
of the Complaint.”398 The majority concluded that it was
“inconceivable that the Respondent did not register the
Domain Name with the Complainant’s name and trade mark
in mind and in the hope and expectation that it would lead
to a commercial benefit for the Respondent.”399 Finally, the
majority found that the “Domain Name was registered and .
. . used in bad faith within the meaning of paragraphs
4(a)(iii) and 4(b)(iv) of the Policy,” in that “the Respondent’s
intention was to mislead internet users and thereby derive a
commercial benefit from being seen to be associated in some
way with the Complainant.”400
Dr. Woo dissented: “In my opinion, the Complainant
has proved none of the three elements of the Policy
paragraph 4(a).”401 On the first element, she stated, “It is
difficult for me to be convinced that the Domain Name
<amazonpic.com>
is
confusingly
similar
to
the
Complainant’s trademark AMAZON.COM. Although
<amazonpic.com> and AMAZON.COM may look similar
literally, ‘amazon’ is a generic name that not only means a
river but also female warrior or tall, vigorous woman . . .

Id.
Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id. (Woo, Pan., dissenting).
397
398
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.”402 The dissent also questioned whether there was
sufficient evidence to support similarity of use, products and
services, users, and channels of distribution. Moreover,
Panelist Woo disagreed with the majority’s view that
“Amazon.com is so famous that there must be a risk of
confusion.”403
The dissenting opinion also stated that the
respondent demonstrated its right and legitimate interest in
the domain name under paragraph 4(c)(i) by registering the
corporate name “amazonpicture”, operating a multimedia
shopping mall, and registering and using the domain name
<amazonpic.com>, which, along with <amazonpic.co.kr>,
was “quite naturally wanted and obtained by the
Respondent, given its company name.”404 But in doing so,
the dissent did not address a matter included in the factual
background portion of the decision, namely, that the
respondent did not commence its business until after it
registered the domain name.405 As noted above, the majority
stated that it was “inconceivable” that the respondent did

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
404 Id.
405 See id. (“4. Factual Background”). Indeed, the respondent’s response,
the substance of which the decision quotes in full, includes the
statement, “We . . . have been running a commercial shopping mall
business based on a registered internet domain of <amazonpic.com> in
Korea.” Id. (“5. Parties’ Contentions.” “B. Respondent”) (emphasis
added). The response also stated that the respondent “legally registered
a corporation name of amazonpicture and its trademark . . . and
successfully received a trademark registration,” but did not state when.
Id.
402
403
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not register the domain name with the complainant and its
mark in mind.406
Panelist Woo characterized the majority’s decision
regarding the bad faith element as “the most
problematic.”407 Initially, she offered that there was no
evidence of bad faith examples under paragraph 4(b)(i)-(iii).
Urging that there was also no evidence that the respondent
intentionally attempted to attract Internet visitors to the
respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion
with the complainant’s mark, under paragraph 4(b)(iv), the
dissent stated,
Most of the users of the respondent’s web site
seem to be Koreans and my guess is that they
would not consider AMAZON.COM so much
to be a seller of movies and other multimedia
products as the Complainant argues.
AMAZON.COM seems to be primarily
considered a book-seller in Korea. To what
extent AMAZON.COM is considered a seller of
movies and other products, and whether
Koreans would be confused by this Domain
Name and think that it is affiliated to
AMAZON.COM is a question that the
Complainant must have shown, but failed.408
This portion of the dissent, which is reminiscent of
Panelist Hwang’s dissent in Sung Hee Cho, posits that even
though the complainant’s “AMAZON.COM” mark may be

Id.
Id. (Woo, Pan., dissenting).
408 Id.
406
407
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well-known for online book sales, confusion can and should
not be assumed when the mark or a similar rendition is used
for movies or DVDs (<amazonpic.com>). Panelist Woo
warned of the “quite serious and negative policy
implications” of the majority decision, which “implies that
no other entity could register any domain name that
includes <amazon.com> because it is a trademark. This
would result in granting too much right to the Complainant,
preventing all the others from using otherwise available
domain names, and protecting the status quo too
strongly.”409
With the dissenting views in the above two
Amazon.com decisions in mind, two hypotheticals are
offered for consideration. Assume that an individual, a
resident of the U.S., avers in a sworn affidavit that her first
name is Samantha, and that she previously performed as a
singer and band member at local events near her residence.
She begins a new business relating to the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of intimate apparel, and to this end,
registers the domain name <samsunglingerie.com>. Or the
individual is Samuel, also a former singer, who registers
<samsungjockstraps.com>,410 which resolves to a website for
men’s sporting equipment. Assume also that a Korean
company, claiming rights in a mark identical to the term
preceding the generic name of the product that appears in
both domain names, protests that Samuel and Samantha
have engaged in cybersquatting, abusively registering and

Id.
As of this writing, according to the <whois.com> database, the two
hypothetical domain names are available.
409
410
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using the domain names, in violation of the company’s
purported trademark rights. The Korean party files a UDRP
complaint with WIPO.
The Policy and the UDRP Rules govern. The
appointed panel, at its discretion, may refer to prior
decisions (and separate opinions) for guidance. In order for
the complainant to win transfer of each domain name from
the respondent, it must demonstrate that:
Ø   the domain name (<samsunglingerie.com> and
<samsungjockstraps.com>)
is
identical
or
confusingly similar to a mark in which the
complainant has rights (say, “SAMSUNG”);
Ø   the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name;411 and
Ø   the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.
Regarding the bad faith element, and the requisite
component of the respondent’s knowledge of the
complainant at the time of the registration of the domain
name, a panel may well declare that it “strains belief” or that
it is “inconceivable” that the respondent did not know of the
complainant and its trademark. But one wonders if the
views expressed in the dissenting opinions in the
Amazon.com cases, especially those relating to the scope of
products for which the mark enjoys fame and reputation,
should be applied. That is, if it is true that SAMSUNG is

Here, the panel would have to address the respondent’s likely
averment that “sam” refers to her or his first name, by which she or he
has always been known, and “sung” is the past participle of a generic
term that indicates a previous hobby of the respondent.
411
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well-known worldwide for electronic products, but not for
intimate apparel or men’s athletic equipment, and if the
respondent’s website is limited to those respective products,
should the panel determine that the respondent did not
attempt to attract Internet users to its website by creating a
likelihood of confusion?
IV. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy provides for a method of resolving a dispute between
a registrant of a domain name and a trademark holder who
alleges cybersquatting. The method is an alternative to an
action in the courts, which may not be desirable in disputes
involving the Internet and parties from different countries.
The UDRP process stands in contrast to traditional
arbitration, but borrows much from the arbitration method,
especially arbitration in the international context. The World
Intellectual Property Organization, a major dispute
resolution service provider of UDRP proceedings,
administered the fifty-eight cases involving Korean parties
that are the focus of this article. The proceedings led to
administrative panel decisions by three-member panels. The
panel decisions as a group shed light on the interpretation
and application of key provisions of the Policy that govern
in the resolution of disputes over domain names. Some of
the 58 decisions include separate and dissenting views on
issues relating to the language of the proceeding, reverse
domain name hijacking, the appropriate timing of the
complainant’s trademark rights, panel discretion regarding
procedural issues, and the multifaceted bad faith element
under paragraph 4. These decisions (and the views therein)
assist parties and panelists to understand the application of
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the Policy. The 58 decisions may also contribute to a
developing “UDRP jurisprudence.”
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APPENDIXA

a

The nationality of each complainant and respondent is based on
its listed address on the panel’s published decision. The nationality
of the panelist is taken from his or her individual profile on
WIPO’s Internet site, WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel/panelists.html, or
where it is not available, from a search link on WIPO’s main
website, http://www.wipo.int, or a search on the Internet. Some
panelists are deceased. Where panelists declared multiple
nationalities, they are indicated in the order listed, and by “/”
separating the nationalities. Where the panelist’s nationality differs
from his or her listed address, the address is indicated second,
following “;”. Two U.S.-based panelists of Korean national origin
who declared American nationality are indicated as “USA, ROK.”
Three-letter abbreviations are used to indicate nationality, using a
list by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Moving
Forward: 2011 Annual Report, IOC 94-95,
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Olym
pic_Solidarity/2011_report_Moving_Forward.pdf.
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Case No.

Complainant

Respondentb

Domain
name(s)

Decision

Panelistsc

D2000-1007

Sony Kabushiki
Kaisha (JPN)

Sin, Eonmok

mysony.com

Transfer

Barker, I. (NZL)
Christie, A. (AUS)
Wilson, R. (AUS)

2

D2000-1074

Sony Kabushiki
Kaisha (JPN)

sony.net

sony.net

Transfer

Willoughby, T.
(GBR)
Carabelli, A. (ITA)
Lee, M. (KOR)

3

D2000-1434

SMS Demag
AG (GER)

Seung Gon,
Kim

smsdemag.com

Transfer

Barker, I. (NZL)

smsdemag.com

Transfer

Hoeren, T. (GER)

b

If a privacy or identity shield service is included as a named
respondent party, it is omitted. The respondent’s nationality is
indicated only if it is not Korea.
c

The presiding panelist is listed first. Titles of panelists (e.g.,
“Honorable,” “Q.C.,” “Esq.”) as indicated in the decisions are not
included here. “Jong, S.” and “Jung, S.” are the same panelist. For
this panelist, “Jong” appears as the surname in decisions in
English; “Jung” appears as the surname on the panelist’s individual
profile on WIPO’s Internet site. This Article’s author is indicated
by “Lee, I.”
d

The language of the decision is indicated if it is not English. Any
separate and dissenting opinions are noted.

Commentsd
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Lee, M. (KOR)

4

Case No.

Complainant

Responde
nt

Domain
name(s)

Decision

Panelists

D2001-0776

Strongarm
Designs, Inc.
(USA)

Arisu
Tech

strongarm.com

Denied

Hunter, D. (AUS; USA)

Comments

Lackert, C. (USA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

5

6

D2001-0778

D2001-0870

Playboy
Enterprises
International,
Inc. (USA)

Sookwan
Park

SEMATECH,
Inc. (USA)

Lee
Hyungyu

playboysportsb
ooks.com

Transfer

Jong, S. (KOR)
Hwang, B. (KOR)
Michaelson, P. (USA)

sematech.com

Transfer

Bennett, A. (AUS)
Chang, M. (KOR)
Methvin, G. (USA)

7

D2001-1275

Amazon.com
, Inc. (USA)

Amazonin
su
Company

amazon119.co
m

Transfer

Separate
decisions in
Korean,
English

Barker, I. (NZL)
Donahey, M. (USA)
Hwang, B. (KOR)

8

9

D2001-1276

D2001-1411

Amazon.com
, Inc. (USA)

VoiceStream
Wireless
Corporation
(USA)

Sung Hee
Cho

Hanjin Ko

amazoncar.com
amazonecar.co
m

voicestream.or
g

Transfer
Transfer
(2-1)

Transfer

Barker, I. (NZL)
Donahey, M. (USA)
Hwang, B. (KOR)
Perkins D. (UK)
Hunter, D. (AUS; USA)
Song, S. (KOR)

Dissent by
Hwang

2016
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D2002-0330
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Amazon.com
, Inc. (USA)

Amazonpi
c

amazonpic.com

559

Transfer

Willoughby, T. (GBR)

(2-1)

Plant, D. (USA)

Dissent by
Woo

Woo, J. (KOR)

11

Case
No.

Complainant.

Respondent

Domain name(s)

Decision

Panelists

Comments

D20020368

Experian
Information
Solutions, Inc.
(USA)

Jeonggon
Seo

experian.net

Transfer

Lee, M. (KOR)

Decision in Korean

Hunter, D. (AUS;
USA)
Woo, J. (KOR)

12

D20020513

Carfax, Inc.
(USA)

COMn.CO
M

carfax.net

Transfer

Anand, P. (IND)
Hwang, B. (KOR)
Trotman, C. (GBR;
NZL)

13

D20020835

United Airlines,
Inc. (USA)

United
Airline Dot
Com

unitedairline.com

Transfer

Anand, P. (IND)
Hwang, B. (KOR)
Samuels, J. (USA)

14

15

D20021181

D20030079

Societe Nationale
de Television
France3 (FRA)

Hitachi Maxell
Kabushiki Kaisha
(JPN)

Segwon
Kim

Gyuhwa
Chung

france3.com

Denied

Jung, S. (KOR)

Woo, J. (KOR)

Decision in Korean;
dissenting opinion
described in panel
decision; no
separate opinion

Jung, S. (KOR)

Decision in Korean

Dreyfus, N. (FRA)

maxell.net

Transfer

Hwang, B. (KOR)
Lee, M. (KOR)

560
16

17

D20030101
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Konica
Corporation
(JPN) & Minolta
Kabushiki Kaisha
(JPN)

Jin Hee Lee

konica-minolta.com
konicaminolta.com

V. 23

Transfer

Lee, M. (KOR)

Transfer

Limbury, A.
(GBR/AUS)

Decision in Korean

Park, H. (KOR;
USA)

Case No.

Complainant

Respondent

Domain names

Decision

Panelists

Comments

D20030192

Produits
Berger (FRA)

Pil Technlogy
Korea Ltd.

lampebergerkr.com

Transfer

Chang, M. (KOR)

Decision in
Korean

Bensoussan, A. (FRA)
Kim, Y. (KOR)

18

19

D20030400

D20030774

Casio
Keisanki
Kabushiki
Kaisha (Casio
Computer
Co., Ltd.)
(JPN)

Jongchan Kim

Amazon.com
, Inc. (USA)

Kim Yoon-Jo

casioshop.net

Transfer

Limbury, A.
(GBR/AUS)
Elliott, C.
(NZL/GBR)
Hwang, B. (KOR)

amazonfire.com

Transfer

Pinansky, T. (USA;
KOR)
Chang, M. (KOR)
Donahey, M. (USA)

20

D20030891

Societe Air
France (FRA)

Daung Soo
Ghim

airfrance‑klm.com

Transfer

Park, H. (KOR; USA)

airfranceklm.com

Transfer

Hwang, B. (KOR)

Decision in
Korean

Vivant, M. (FRA)
21

D20030939

NHN
Corporation
(KOR)

NHN Corp.,
National
Health

nhn.com

Transfer

Willoughby, T. (GBR)
Abel, S. (USA)

*President of
Respondent is of
Korean origin
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Jong, S. (KOR)

Network
(USA)*
22

D20040154

The Hotel
Ritz, Limited
(FRA)

Kim Min-Kouk

561

weddingritz.com.

Transfer

Nitter, P. (NOR)
Jong, S. (KOR)
Thorne, C. (GBR)
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Case
No.

Complainant

Respondent

Domain names

Decision

Panelists

Comments

D200
40764

NBC Universal, Inc.
(USA) & Universal City
Studios LLLP (USA)

Junak Kwon

nbcuniversal.com

Transfer

Hwang, B.
(KOR)

Decision in
Korean;
opinion of
Barker in
English

Barker, I. (NZL)
Seo, I. (USA,
KOR)

24

D200
40984

Minka Lighting, Inc.
d/b/a Minka Group
(USA)

Lee Wongi

minkagroup.com

Transfer

Seo, I. (USA;
KOR)
Lee, I.
(KOR/USA)
Turner, J. (UK)

25

26

D200
50393

D200
50504

British Standard
Institution (GBR)

The News Corporation
Limited (USA)

BSI
Inspectorate
Korea Ltd.

Yoon Jinsu

bsiinspectorate.com
bsiinspectorate.co
m

Transfer
Transfer

Hwang, B.
(KOR)

Denied

Seo, I. (US;
KOR)

inspectorate.biz
inspectorate.net
inspectorate.org

Denied

Woo, J. (KOR)

newscorporation.
com

Transfer

Decision in
Korean

Denied
Seo, I. (USA;
KOR)

Decision in
Korean

Hwang, B.
(KOR)
Ricketson, S.
(AUS)

27

D200
60226

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
(USA)

iContents

samclub.com

Denied
(2-1)

Park, H. (KOR;
USA)

Decision in
Korean;
dissent by
Lee, in
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Jung, S. (KOR)

English

Lee, I.
(KOR/USA)
28

D200
60250

Jet Marques (FRA)

Vertical Axis,
Inc.

jettour.com

Denied

Smith, W. (AUS)
Gautier, P.
(FRA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

29

D200
60567

STX LLC (USA)

Yu nae ho &
Jinsu Kim

stx.com

Transfer
(2-1)

Nodine, L.
(USA)
Abel, S. (USA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

Dissent by
Sorkin

30

Case No.

Complainant

Respondent

Domain names

Decision

Panelists

Comments

D20060625

Shoulderdoc
Limited (GBR)

Vertical Axis,
Inc.

shoulderdoc.co
m

Denied

Rothnie, W.
(AUS)

Unidentified
panelist
would have
declined
decision on
¶ 4(a)(i)
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Harris, M.
(GBR)
Sorkin, D.
(USA)
31

D20060905

Proto Software,
Inc. (USA)

Vertical Axis,
Inc./PROTO.C
OM

proto.com

Denied &
RDNH

Payne, A.
(AUS/NZL/IR
L)
Carmody, J.
(USA)
Sorkin, D.
(USA)

32

D20060930

Deutsche
Telekom AG
(GER)

Unitedeurope
Consulting
KOR

t-biz.com

Transfer

t-box.com

Transfer

tbroadcast.com

Denied

Hwang, B.
(KOR)

Transfer

Jong, S. (KOR)

t-city.com
t-health.com
t-home.com
t-jobs.com
t-network.com
t-portal.com
t-sales.com

Seo, I. (USA;
KOR)

Denied
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Denied
Denied
Denied

t-show.com
33

D20061089

Educational
Testing Service
(USA)

Hackers
Language
Institute /
David Cho,
Ph.D.

hackerstoefl.co
m
hackerstoeic.co
m

Denied
Denied

Wefers Bettink,
W. (NED)
Jong, S. (KOR)
Li, Y. (CHN)

2016
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D20061240

Groupe Canal+
Company (FRA)

THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS

Jinsoo Yoon

canalplus.com

Transfer
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Lee, I.
(KOR/USA)
Bertrand, A.
(FRA)
Hwang, B.
(KOR)
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Case No.

Complainant

Respondent

Domain names

Decision

Panelists

D2006-1446

Chivas
Brothers
Limited, et al.

Anyweb Co.,
Ltd.

chivas.net

Transfer

Pinansky, T. (USA; KOR)

D2007-0017

HSM Argentina
S.A. (ARG)

Comments

Gold, A. (GBR)
Lee, I. (KOR/USA)

(non-KOR)

36
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Vertical Axis,
Inc.

hsm.com

Denied

Barker, J. (AUS/GBR)
Larus, C. (USA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

37

D2007-0417

Nursefinders,
Inc. (USA)

Vertical Axis,
Inc.

nursefinder.co
m

Denied

Blackmer, W. (USA)
Hines, P. (USA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

38

D2007-0535

IFIL S.p.A
(ITA)

Han Jin Go

ifil.com

Transfer

Pinansky, T. (USA; KOR)
Barbero, L. (ITA)
Cho, J. (KOR)

39

40

D2007-0795

D2007-0856

Bright
Horizons
Family
Solutions Inc.
et al. (USA (2),
IRL, CAN)

Vertical Axis,
Inc.

Esquire
Innovations,
Inc. (USA)

Vertical Axis,
Inc,

brighthorizon.c
om

Denied

Turner, J. (GBR)
Johnson, C. (USA)
Sorkin, D. (USA)

iscrub.com

Transfer

Brown, N. (AUS/GBR)

(2-1)

Sorkin, D. (USA)

Dissent by
Sorkin

2016
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Tatham, D. (GBR)

41

Case
No.

Complainant

Respondent

Domain
names

Decision

Panelists

D20071120

Hertz System,
Inc.

Jeff Park

herts.com

Transfer

Barker, J. (AUS/GBR)
Blackmer, W. (USA)

(USA)

42

43

44

D20071513

D20080091

D20080531

Sorkin, D. (USA)
mornay.com

IPGM
Institution Mixte
de Prévoyance
du Groupe
Mornay (FRA)

Sooyong
Kim

Digital Overture
Inc. (USA)

Chris
Bradfield*
(USA) &
GoPets Ltd.

gopets.net

Webmedia

itau.net

Banco Itau S.A.
(BRA)

Denied

Kim, G. (USA, KOR)
Jong, S. (KOR)
Le Stanc, C. (FRA)

Denied &

Barker, J. (AUS/GBR)

RDNH (2-1
on RDNH)

Bernstein, D. (USA)

Transfer

Hwang, B. (KOR)

Davis, G. (USA)

Loureiro Oliveira, A. (BRA)
Willoughby, T. (GBR)

45

D20081390

Hisamitsu
Pharmaceutical
Co., Inc. (JPN)

Chang Il
Min

hisamitsu.co
m

Transfer

Lee, I. (KOR/USA)
Nahm, H. (KOR)
Sato, K. (JPN)

46

D20081407

Tokyu
Corporation

Comments

Jeongyong
Cho

capitoltokyu
.com

Transfer

Choi, C. (KOR)
Cho, J. (KOR)

Respondent
Bradfield is
executive of
GoPets Ltd.
On RDNH
finding,
dissenter not
identified
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47

48

V. 23

Dogauchi, M. (JPN)

Case No.

Complainant.

Respondent

Domain names

Decision

Panelists

DAU200
8-0002

Topfield Co.
Ltd. (KOR)

Jai Kemp
(AUS) &
Digital
Products
Group Pty
Ltd. (AUS)

itopfield.com.au

Denied

Limbury, A.
(GBR/AUS)

D2009-0239

Reckitt
Benckiser
Plc (GBR)

Eunsook Wi

i-topfield.net.au

Transfer
Denied

Comments

Argy, P. (AUS)
Rothnie, W. (AUS)

topfieldaustralia.com.au
topfield.com.au

Transfer

topfield.net.au

Transfer

rb.net

Denied

Joppich, B. (GER)
Abbott, F. (USA)
Bridgeman, J. (IRL)

49

50

51

D2009-1630

DVE20100001

D2011-0075

Samsung
Electroni
cs Co.,
Ltd
(KOR)

Pimser
Electronics
Ltd. (Samsung
Turkey) (TUR)

samsungturkey.
com

Samsung
Network
s Co.,
Ltd.
(KOR)

SuperVirtualO
ffice Corp.
(USA)

samsung.com.ve

Witmer
Public
Safety
Group,

Kwang pyo
Kim

Transfer

Samaras, H. (USA)
Lee, D. (KOR)
Tatham, D. (USA)

Transfer

O’Farrell, M. (ARG)
Erdozain, J. (ESP)

Decision in
Spanish

Steinhardt, J.
(GBR/USA)
firestore.com

Denied

Kennedy, G. (IRL; HKG)
Hudis, J. (USA)

Concurring by
Hudis;
concurring in
part, dissenting

2016

THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS

Inc.
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Brown, N. (AUS/GBR)

(USA)
52

53

54

D2011-1005

The
Knowlan
d Group
(USA)

Trademark
Managements

knowland.com

Transfer

Park, A. (USA, KOR)
Chang, M. (KOR)
Lee, I. (KOR/USA)

Case No.

Complainant.

Respondent

Domain
names

Decision

Panelists

D2011-1407

Heimbs
Kaffee GmbH
& Co. KG
(GER)

Ho Kyoung
Trading Co,
Ltd., Heui-il
Kang

allegretto.co
m

Denied

Rindforth, P. (SWE)

UTV Limited
(GBR)

Unitedeurope
Consulting,
Kwang Pyo Kim

utv.com

D2011-2293

in part by
Brown

Comments

Lodigiani, A. (ITA)
Park, H. (KOR;
USA)

Denied

Meijboom, A. (NED)
Brown, N.
(AUS/GBR)
Park, A. (USA, ROK)

55

D2012-2184

Orion
Corporation
(KOR)

Jang, Dong
(USA)*

chocopie.co
m

Transfer

Barbero, L. (ITA)
Chang, M. (KOR)
Dabney, J. (USA)

56

D2013-1838

JJGC
Industria E
Comercio de
Materiais
Dentarios
S.A. (BRA)

Yun-Ki Kim

neodent.co
m

Denied
&
RDNH

Lyon, R. (USA)
Chang, M. (KOR)
Pereira Dos Santos,
M. (BRA)

*Respondent has
business experience
in Korea.

570
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D2013-1844

Deutsche
Lufthansa
AG (GER)
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Kwangpyo Kim

flynet.com

Transfer

V. 23
Alexiev, A. (BUL)
Hoeren, T. (GER)
Brown, N.
(AUS/GBR)

58

D2014-0089

Mobile’s
Republic
(FRA)

Kwangpyo Kim

newsrepubli
c.com

Denied

Khasawneh, N.
(GBR/JOR)
Alexiev, A. (BUL)
Brown, N.
(AUS/GBR)

